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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the policy of the European Union towards sub-Saharan 
Africa since the end of the Cold War. The main research question is: has EU policy 
toward Africa changed fundamentally, and, if so, what are the motivating factors? This 
thesis argues that there indeed is a paradigmatic change in the Africa policy. Especially 
since the formation of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1999, the EU has 
become more active and capable in implementing its missions in the region. 
The author looks first at basic guiding documents, especially the European 
Security Strategy and the EU Strategy for Africa, in order to trace the evolution of the 
EU’s concepts. Then he investigates institutional, military, and civilian crisis 
management capacities available today to operate in that region. A case study on EU 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2003-06 analyzes the scope and 
effectiveness of the EU’s actions. It is shown that the EU has a unique variety of 
instruments available which enable it to operate in a broad mission spectrum. Military 
and civil operations complement one another. The EU’s policy is guided by its norms, by 
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The interaction between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has a long history. 
European discoverers opened sub-Saharan Africa for European influence. This contact 
had serious consequences for Africa. Except for Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole 
continent was colonized by European powers and carved up in spheres of influence; the 
“scramble of Africa” divided Africa into several states, regardless of ethnic belonging. 
The end of the Second World War initiated a new phase, the struggle for independence. 
Decolonialization was, though, superposed by the Cold War. New spheres of influence 
emerged. At the same time, some European states tried to maintain their influence in the 
former colonies.  
Despite the close and lasting relations of some of the Member States of the 
European Union (EU) with sub-Saharan Africa, this region was for a long time not a 
focus of the EU’s external relations. Economic and developmental issues dominated. 
Four significant developments changed this. First, the end of the Cold War very 
much reduced the interest of external actors in Africa. The continent was marginalized 
regarding security issues. That enabled the EU to link its developmental aid to the 
political performance of the recipient sub-Saharan African States. Second, the failure of 
the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda were clear 
signals that economic and developmental support alone was not sufficient to stabilize this 
region. Humanitarian disasters and the refugees arriving at the EU’s frontiers demanded 
external action. The EU needed capacities for that purpose. The EU’s political focus 
shifted from normative values to conflict prevention. Third, the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003 increased the awareness of the European 
governments that Europe needed to define its own security interests. In December 2003 
the EU adopted the first European Security Strategy (ESS) Key threats for the EU’s 
security were identified, some of which are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. The fourth 
development shaping the EU s relation towards sub-Saharan Africa was the initiation of 
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. Intra-institutional changes 
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strongly affected the relations with sub-Saharan Africa. The EU began to create 
capacities to act in crises and to gain more leverage for effective action, which allowed it 
to initiate several missions in DR Congo since.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given this background, this thesis addresses the question: Has the EU’s policy 
toward Africa changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War, and if so, what are 
the motivational factors stimulating this policy-turn? Is there a paradigmatic change in 
the policy towards sub-Saharan Africa? Or is continuity dominating? Has the EU really 
become more active, more capable and more cooperative, or are its strategies and 
concepts still mere political declarations without a major effect?  
In order to answer these questions, subordinate questions are posed: 
• Why does sub-Saharan Africa matter for the EU? (rationale) 
• What are the basic security concepts, strategies and aims of the EU’s 
policy towards sub-Saharan Africa and how did they evolve? (concepts) 
• What means, including capabilities and programs, are available, or in the 
process of development, to promote the EU’s aims? (instruments)  
• How is the EU deploying its assets in the field to implement its policy? 
(implementation)  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis will have to draw on several strands of literature normally not 
combined: EU policy towards Africa in general, ESDP and EU security policies in 
Africa, and case studies of the EU operations in Congo. 
First, no prior work could be identified to provide an analytical overview of the 
EU’s policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, including concepts and implementation as they 
have changed over time. Despite this lack, there is a substantial number of publications 
which are, unfortunately, very fragmented concerning this topic. Due to the rapid 
evolution of both the ESDP and the EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in recent 
years, the literature often provides only a snapshot of current events and is quickly 
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outdated.1 Scholars have published many studies covering parts of this thesis. Most of 
them have a limited focus, but offer profound analysis. Combining them, the author has 
been able to obtain some excellent sources to build on for this research. 
Academic literature providing a comprehensive analysis of the EU – sub-Saharan 
relations is rare. It usually consists of journal articles, due to the fact that new strategies 
have been adopted and new capacities acquired by the EU since 2004.2 In an essay 
written in 2003, Alexandra Krause, analyzing the EU’s role as an international actor in 
Africa, argues that the “policy of the EU towards sub-Saharan Africa – seen from a cross-
pillar perspective including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)  – has 
barely caught the attention of students of European integration.”3 This thesis hopes to 
redress this critique. 
The EU orients its policy towards conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa based on two 
principles: “African ownership” and European-African “partnership.” Stephen Hurt 
argues that the use of the term partnership is “merely rhetorical.”4 This thesis argues that 
the EU’s policy has evolved and that this partnership is more than rhetoric. How the 
partnership is implemented in reality will be discussed. In order to realize “ownership” 
and “partnership” in security affairs, the EU needs willing and capable partners in sub-
Saharan Africa. Partnership is the guiding principle between the EU and African regional 
and sub-regional organizations such as the AU or the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). This is in line with another important principle for the EU’s policy 
towards sub-Saharan Africa: effective multilateralism, defined as “the development of a 
stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based 
                                                 
1 Catriona Gourlay, “European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management.” 
International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 404-421. 
2 Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, “The European Union,” in From Cape to Congo. Southern Africa’s 
Evolving Security Challenges, edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (London, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 301-316.  
3 Alexandra Krause, “The European Union’s Africa Policy: The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur in 
the CFSP,” European Foreign Affairs Review 8, no. 2 (2003): 221. 
4 Stephan R. Hurt, “The European Union’s External Relations with Africa after the Cold War: Aspects 
of Continuity and Chabge,” in Taylor and Williams, Africa in International Politics, 171. 
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international order.”5 The EU is willing to cooperate with the UN on a global level, with 
the AU on a regional level and, for example, SADC on a sub-regional level. The relations 
between the EU and the AU concerning peacekeeping are discussed by Mark Malan, who 
argues that the EU is the most important partner for the AU in establishing its own crisis 
management capabilities – a necessity for “African ownership.”6 
Fernanda Faria argued in 2004 that the “lack of financial resources and weak 
operational capabilities are well-known problems” of the AU.7 Significant progress has 
been made regarding these problems: the EU supports the establishment of African 
capacities and provides significant funds for the conduct of “African owned” 
peacekeeping operations through the African Peace Facility (APF), an institution 
designed by the EU to finance African crisis management operations. Rory Keane, as 
well as Sebastian Wadle and Corinna Schukraft, have come to the conclusion that the EU 
facility is a very important institution for the support of the AU and other African sub-
regional organizations. Kingha argues that this facility is “vital for the operations of the 
AU troops in Sudan.”8 A formal evaluation of the facility was conducted by the 
Neimacro Consortium and resulted in a very positive assessment.9 An important African 
                                                 
5 Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Union Security Strategy. Brussels, 
December 12, 2003, 9. 
6 Siegmar Schmidt, “Prinzipien, Ziele und Institutionen der Afrikanischen Union.” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte  4 (2005), http://www.das-parlament.de/2005/04/ beilage/004.html (accessed May 22, 
2007); Mark Malan, “The European Union and the African Union as Strategic Partners in Peace 
Operations: Not Grasping the Planning and Management Nettle” Paper presented at “The European Union 
in Africa: A Strategic Partner in Peace Operations,” 5th Seminar on Peace Operations by the International 
Peace Academy and the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva, July, 6-7, 2006, http://www.gcsp.ch/e/ 
meetings/CM_Peacebuilding/Peace-Ops/Seminars/EU-Peace_Ops/2006/Malan.pdf (accessed May 22, 
2007). 
7 Fernanda Faria, Crisis Management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union (Paris: 
L’Alenconnaise d’Impressions, 2004) :14, http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ51.pdf (accessed May 22, 
2007). 
8 S.S. Kingah, “The European Union’s New Africa Strategy: Grounds for Cautious Optimism,” 
European Foreign Affairs Review 11 (2006):539. 
9 Rory Keane, “The EU’s African Peace Facility Uncovered: Better Late than Never,” ISIS European 
Security Review, no. 24, (October 2004), http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/ESR%2024%20-
%20APF.PDF (accessed May 22, 2007); Sebastian Wadle and Corina Schukraft, “Die Peace Facility in 
Afrika – Europas Antwort auf die Krisen in Afrika?” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4 (2005): 99-
119; Neimacro Consortium. Mid Term Evaluation of the African Peace Facility Framework-Contract. 
Final Report. Maastricht, January 2006, http://www.dgroups.org/groups/CoOL/docs/APF-Evaluation-
Final_Report-ECDPM_version_for_ECORYS_190106.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007). 
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capability under development is the African Standby Force (ASF), a topic discussed by 
Benedikt Franke, Theo Neethling and Johannes Regenbrecht.10 They argue that the ASF 
is an important tool for African states in order to intervene in African conflicts, but they 
also present evidence that this force will be confronted with many basic problems, such 
as command and control capabilities or logistics. 
Second, the literature concerning the European Security and Defense Policy 
(launched in 1999) is vast and rapidly growing. ESDP has a serious impact on Europe’s 
crisis intervention capacities and policies on a global scale. Significant decisions and 
programs to increase the EU’s capacities were adopted and much progress can be noted. 
This is reflected in the academic literature. 
Important literature is available regarding the core EU strategy, which is also of 
central relevance in this thesis, the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in 
December 2003. The literature varies from mere description to critical assessment.11 
There is no explicit analysis of the relevance of the ESS for sub-Saharan Africa; 
however, the literature offers an important frame for this thesis as the EU Africa policy is 
embedded in the larger ESDP evolution. Stefanie Flechtner has written about the ESDP 
in general and Reinhart Rummel about the civil components of the ESDP. He argues that 
these instruments offer the EU different options for crisis management beyond military 
                                                 
10 Benedikt Franke, “A Pan-African Army: The Evolution of an Idea and its eventual Realization in 
the African Standby Force,” African Security Review 15, no. 4 (December 2006): 2-16; Theo Neethling, 
“Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects,” Military Review, 4-5 
(2005): 68-71; Johannes Regenbrecht, “Afrikanische Bereitschaftstruppe für Friedenseinsätze: Neue 
Perspektiven für Konfliktbewältigung in Afrika?” SWP Diskussionspapier (July 2003), http://www.swp-
berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=678 (accessed May 22, 2007). 
11 Erich Reiter, “Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 3-4, (2004): 26-31; 
Asle Toje, “The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal,” European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 10, no. 1 (2005): 117-133; Alson J. K. Bailes, “The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary 
History,” no. 10 SIPRI Policy Paper. (February 2005), http://www.sipri.org/contents/editors/publications/ 
ESS_PPrapport.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); Klaus Becher, “Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s 
Role in the World after the 2003 European Security Strategy,” European Security 13, no. 4 (2004): 345-
359; Sven Biscop,“The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security,” 
Sécurité et Stratégie no. 82 (March 2004), http://www.forum-europe.com/publication/Artikel.pdf (accessed 
May 22, 2007).  
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interventions.12 Hauser and Kernik edited a volume comprising several essays regarding 
the development of ESDP which present evidence that the EU launched a significant 
program to improve its capacities.13 The volume includes an essay of Sven Biscop, who 
argues that the foundations of the ESS are a concept of “global public goods.” These 
goods are identical to those public goods that the state is supposed to provide on a 
national level.14 
Third, not much literature is available that covers the importance of Africa for 
European security. However, there are helpful seminar reports by the Diplomatic 
Academy of Vienna.15 These volumes edit the presentations of several conferences and 
offer a variety of opinions on the topic. The relevance of developments in sub-Saharan 
Africa for the EU’s security is covered by several authors. Their common conclusion is 
that there are no threats emerging in sub-Saharan Africa which can be tackled by the 
tools of classical territorial defense. Arno Meinken presents convincing evidence that 
African states possess neither the political will nor the military capabilities to threaten the 
EU with military means.16 This does not mean that there are no security threats 
emanating from the region to which the EU has to pay attention. Stefan Mair argues that 
state failure, protracted conflicts, and war economies can prepare the ground for 
international terrorism and that African warlords are an integral part of worldwide 
                                                 
12 Flechtner, Stefanie. “European Security and Defense Policy: Between Offensive Defense and 
Human Security.” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4 (2006): 157-173; Reinhardt Rummel, “Die 
zivile Komponente der ESVP: Reichhaltiges Gestaltungspotential für europäische Krisenintervention.” 
SWP-Studie 16 (July 2006), http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3128 
(accessed May 22, 2007). 
13 Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic eds, European Security in Transition. (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2006). 
14 Sven Biscop, “From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy,” in 
Hauser and Kernik eds. European Security, 87-101. 
15 Diplomatic Academy of Vienna ed, “Peace Operations in Africa,” Favorita Paper 3 (2004), 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/16_ipa_2004.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); Diplomatic 
Academy of Vienna ed, “Developing Peace Partnership in Africa,” Favorita Paper 2 (2005), 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/16_ipa_02_2005.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007). 
16 Arno Meinken, “Militärische Kapazitäten und Fähigkeiten afrikanischer Staaten. Ursachen und 
Wirkungen militärischer Ineffektivität in Sub-Sahara Afrika,” SWP-Studie 4 (February 2005), 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1929 (accessed May 22, 2007). 
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organized crime, sometimes involved in spoiling peace processes. He assumes that these 
developments could create serious challenges for the EU’s internal security.17  
The EU committed itself to support the implementation of the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) and argues that security is the prerequisite for sustainable 
development – without security, the MDG could not be achieved. This argument is 
supported by Guido Schmitt-Traub and Prateek Tandon, but they also allege that only 
development in sub-Saharan Africa can prevent the emergence of security threats to 
Germany and other developed countries.18 
Last, there is some academic writing both on the DRC as a war-torn country in 
general and on the ESDP crisis management operations there in particular. A seminal 
academic work is the book of Crawford Young and Thomas Turner.19 It covers the rise 
and decline of Zaire, the former name of the DRC, between 1965 and the early 1980s. A 
historical introduction is provided by Edgerton.20 Economic dimensions of the lasting 
conflict are examined by Michael Nest.21 The involvement of African neighbors is the 
focus of a book edited by John F. Clark.22 The topics of Michaela Wrong’s book are the 





                                                 
17 Stefan Mair, “Konfliktpotentiale in Afrika. Eine Bedrohung Europäischer Sicherheit?” Reader 
Sicherheitspolitik 12 (2003): 106 -112. 
18 Schmidt-Traub and Prateek Tandon, “Security and the Millennium Development Goals,” BICC 
Bulletin no. 27 (October/November 2005). 
19 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). 
20 Robert B. Edgerton, The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo (New York, N.Y.: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2002). 
21 Michael Nest, Francois Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Economic Dimensions of War and Peace (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
22 John F Clark, ed. The African Stakes of the Congo War (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2002). 
23 Michaela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz. Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo 
(New York: Perennial, 2002). 
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these works, it became clear that the root causes of state failure, protracted conflict and 
the involvement of seven Central and South African states in “Africa’s First World 
War”24 are manifold.  
Despite the problematic structure of this conflict, the EU conducted its first fully 
autonomous military crisis management operation, ARTEMIS, in an eastern province of 
the DRC. James Miskel and Richard J. Norton argue that although this intervention came 
late, it was successful. They allege that “the use of traditional tools of diplomacy and 
peacekeeping are not appropriate for areas such as DRC” and that ARTEMIS is “a 
‘blueprint’ for conducting successful operations in such an environment.”25 The second 
military ESDP operation, EUFOR DRC, was terminated in 2006. Only a few articles 
cover that issue, such as an essay by Hans-Georg Erhart who argues that this mission has 
to be interpreted in the light of overall EU strategies regarding sub-Saharan Africa.26  
Much of the material on the Congo operations is published by the EU via its 
official webpage. In some media articles, the EU’s mission is portrayed as necessary and 
successful in implementing its mission goals, but criticized in general because of its 
limited effect and its focus only on short-term engagement.27  
There are several controversies discernable in the literature. Authors 
concentrating more on developmental issues of the EU’s policy argue that the 
subordination of development under security minimizes the importance of that issue. The 
interpretation of development as a tool to tackle the root causes of violent conflicts and to 
increase the security of the EU also reduces the available funds and detracts from the core 
                                                 
24 Emizet F. Kisangani, “Legacies of the War Economy: Economic Challenges for Postconflict 
Reconstruction,” in Nest, Grignon and Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo, 99. 
25 James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, “The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 
Civil Wars 6, no. 4 (2003): 10; Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis. 
The Shape of Things to come?” International Peacekeeping, 11, no. 3 (2004): 508-525. 
26 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Was soll die EU im Kongo? Die Europäische Afrika-Strategie zwischen 
Symbolik, Realpolitik und Kosmopolitischem Engagement,” Internationale Politik 61, no. 6 (2006): 84-89. 
27 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Nichts wie weg? Zum Ende des EU-Militäreinsatzes im Kongo,“Hamburger 
Informationen zur Friedensforschung 41 (December 2006), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm 
?lng=en&id=26893 (accessed May 22, 2007); Atlantische Initiative, Der Einsatz für Stabilität im Kongo. 
Die EUFOR-Mission und die Wahlen im Kongo. Lessons Learned, http://www.global-agenda.org/files/a-
i/kongo_reader.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).  
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tasks of development policy. Evidence supporting that critique is the design of the 
African Peace Facility, an instrument to fund African owned peace keeping operations. It 
is financed through the European Development Fund (EDF). Others like Stefan Mair 
disagree:28 They plea for less altruism and more engagement in the EU’s Africa policy. 
This thesis will argue that the EU has shifted, indeed, from an altruistic development 
policy to a policy that has to serve the EU’s security interests. 
The motives for the conduct of the first military ESDP operation are controversial 
among academics. Fernanda Faria presents evidence that the EU’s first autonomous 
military crisis management operation was considerably influenced by France, since the 
preparations for a unilateral French intervention had been nearly complete.29 Stefan Mair 
argues the converse, that France had no national interests in Ituri to pursue.30 Catherine 
Gegout conducted research concerning the motives of the EU to intervene in the DRC in 
2003. She argues with a realist explanation, that “the EU is only likely to intervene in 
areas of strategic and economic importance, and at the low cost of military casualties” 
and that “the ARTEMIS mission can be considered as a ‘one off’ mission, and not as the 
first EU military intervention of a series of interventions.” She concludes it is unlikely 
“that the EU is … to act primarily for humanitarian reasons.”31 Despite the fact that her 
prognosis is vitiated in general by the 2006 EU military crisis management operation 
EUFOR DRC, she was correct in that the EU Member States were reluctant to 
participate, as Peter Schmidt also purports.32 
Representative for another repeatedly discussed issue is Gorm Rye Olsen’s 
proposition, that the EU has indeed an Africa policy but that this policy is not clear cut 
                                                 
28 Stefan Mair, “Weniger Altruismus, mehr Engagement: Doch wie genau soll ein solches 
Engagement aussehen?” Internationale Politik 61, no. 4 (April 2006): 34-41. 
29 Faria, “Crisis Management,” 14 
30 Stefan Mair, “Einsatzgebiet Kongo. Die EU Friedensmission in der Ituri-Provinz.” SWP-Aktuell 22 
(June 2003): 1-2, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=128 (accessed May 
22, 2007). 
31 Catherine Gegout, “Causes and Consequences of the EU’s Military Intervention in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation.” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 3 (2005): 429, 442. 
32 Peter Schmidt, “Freiwillige vor!” Internationale Politik 61, no. 11 (November 2006): 68-77. 
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and may lack “consistency and coherence.” He worries about the danger that the EU will 
not “implement all policy declarations and policy intentions.”33 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will determine which factors cause change and continuity in the EU’s 
policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. The African conflicts and their escalation since 
1989/90 are the independent variable (IV). The EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa 
is the dependent variable (DV). Conditional variables (CV) are three factors that 
influence the EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: first its foundations, i.e., the EU’s 
normative values and its past Africa policy; second, exogenous factors such as the 
experience of recent humanitarian disasters in central Africa, the perception of threats 
emanating from sub-Saharan Africa and the experience with ESDP operations in other 
regions; and third, the particular interests of Great Britain and France in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
This thesis combines qualitative content analysis, process tracing and a single 
case study. At the beginning the author will examine several central documents, issued by 
the Council of the European Union and the European Commission between 1990 and 
2005, in order to trace the evolution of the EU’s basic concepts for sub-Saharan Africa. 
This chapter will examine concepts, declarations and communications regarding peace 
and security in sub-Saharan Africa, adopted since the 1990s. The examination will be 
based on qualitative content analysis. The main concepts are the Council Communication 
The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa and the Council Communication on Conflict 
Prevention; the EU Council document Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, The 
European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU Strategy for Africa (EUSFA), the EU Council 
document EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform; the Commission 
Communication A Concept for the European Community Support for Security Sector 
Reform and the EU Concept for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.  
 
                                                 
33 Gorm Rye Olsen, “Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The 
Africa Policy of the EU,” The Round Table 93, no. 375 (2004): 425. 
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Security issues are at the center of this analysis. The author will also explore the 
relevance of the “key threats” for the EU’s security, mentioned in the ESS, for sub-
Saharan Africa. 
The next chapter introduces the EU’s concept of “effective multilateralism” as a 
way to promote its policy, but also as a norm per se. The author will present not only the 
EU’s understanding of this concept but also two of its major partners in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The survey is limited to two African organizations, the African Union (AU), 
which is the major partner for the EU in Africa, and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), whose member states were involved in the DRC conflict as well as 
in its solution. 
The following chapter analyses the influence of two EU Members States on the 
EU’s policy toward sub-Saharan Africa. It will be shown that France and Great Britain 
directed ESDP decisively towards sub-Saharan Africa. 
The next chapter will study the implementation of the EU’s concepts towards sub-
Saharan Africa. The main intention is to find out how, and to which extent, the EU is in 
fact implementing its political declarations of intent. The author investigates successively 
institutional, military and civilian crisis management capacities available today for the 
EU for sub-Saharan Africa. It will be shown that the EU has a unique array of 
instruments available which enable the EU to operate as a single actor in a broad mission 
spectrum. Military and civil operations complement one another.  
This chapter will close with the case study: the analysis of the EU’s engagement 
in the DRC since 1990. Process tracing again is the primary method. The intention is to 
find out which factors determine the EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis 
is restricted to this single case because the EU’s ESDP crisis management operations in 
Africa are, with the exception of supportive measures of the AU operation in Darfur, 
limited to the DRC. Nevertheless, the EU has accomplished two ESDP military crisis 
management operations and is conducting two civil crisis management operations in the 
DRC. The case study will demonstrate that all three conditional variables had their 
impact on the EU’s policy toward the DRC: first, the EU’s normative values in the form 
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of the EU’s obligation to effective multilateralism; second, exogenous factors in the form 
of a new threat perception; and third, France’s interests in that region. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU’S BASIC CONCEPTS FOR 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE 1990 
This chapter presents the basic driving factors for the EU’s policy towards sub-
Saharan Africa: Why is the EU engaged in crisis management in that region? The author 
argues that three external triggers changed significantly the EU’s sub-Saharan Africa 
policy. First, the end of the Cold War; second, the experience of mission failure in 
Somalia and of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994/1995; and third, the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and their aftermath culminating in the Iraq war in 2003.  
The author will show that the EU’s motives are, on the one hand, the European’s 
determination to promote their normative values in order to build a “better world” and, on 
the other hand, the realization that they have to engage in conflicts before they escalate 
violently. The political aims of the Cold War period did not fade away, but they lost 
importance in favor of security issues.  
A. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE EU’S POLICY TOWARDS SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
The interaction between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has a long history. 
European discoverers seeking personal or national benefit opened sub-Saharan Africa for 
European influence. This contact had serious consequences for Africa. Except for 
Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole continent was colonized by European powers and carved 
up in spheres of influence; the “scramble of Africa,” conducted at the Berlin Conference 
in 1884-85, divided Africa into several states, regardless of ethnic belonging. The end of 
the Second World War initiated a new phase of African–European relations, the struggle 
for independence. Decolonization was superposed by the Cold War and wars were fought 
by the superpowers and their alleged proxies. New spheres of influence emerged. Both 
superpowers tried to maintain the status quo or to gain control of new clients. At the same 
time, European states such as France and Great Britain tried to maintain their influence in 
the former colonies or to secure their possessions, as did Portugal, which released its 
colonies late in the mid-1970s.  
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Despite the close and lasting relations of some of the Member States of the 
European Community (EC), the precursor organizations of the EU, with sub-Saharan 
Africa, this region was for a long time not a focus of the EU’s external relations. The EC 
was primarily focused on economic and developmental issues regarding sub-Saharan 
Africa until the end of the Cold War. 
Four significant developments shaped the relations of the EU towards sub-
Saharan Africa since 1989/90. First, the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the interest 
of external actors in Africa. The continent was perceived to be marginal regarding global 
security issues. That enabled the EU to link its developmental aid to the political 
performance of the recipient sub-Saharan African States. As elsewhere, the principle of 
conditionality linked European aid to good governance. 
The second development shaping the EU’s relations towards Africa was the 
confrontation with serious problems in sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1990s: the failure 
of the UN peacekeeping operation UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993-95) and the genocide 
in Rwanda in April 1994 were clear signals that economic and developmental support 
alone was not sufficient to stabilize this region, to prevent crises from emerging or even 
to stop violence and conflict.34 The European governments realized that Africa could not 
be left on its own. Humanitarian disasters and the refugees arriving at the EU’s frontiers 
called for external action. This perception had a serious impact; the EU began to develop 
capacities for that purpose. Recognizing the lack of capabilities for intervention or 
conducting EU crisis management operations, the EU had to rely on the capabilities and 
actions of its Member States, the UN or on African sub-regional organizations. The EU’s 
political focus shifted from normative values to conflict prevention. The Balkan war 
experience bolstered this insight. Concepts were developed for how and in which phase 
the EU would be able to act concerning crises in Africa. Conflict prevention focused on 
the root causes of conflicts and how the EU could tackle them. 
                                                 
34 Michael Bauer, “Peace-building durch ‘Strukturelle Stabilität?’ Möglichkeit und Grenzendes 
Konfliktpräventionsparadigmas der Europäischen Union,” Arbeitspapiere zu Problemen der 
Internationalen Politik und der Entwicklungsforschung 42 (2005): 10, http://www.forschungsstelle-dritte-
welt.de/Dokumente/AP/AP_42_Bauer.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); Olsen, “Challenges,” 431. 
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The third group of events influencing the EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa 
was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003. The European 
Council, the highest decision-making body of the EU, consisting of the Heads of State 
and Government (or Ministers) of the Member States, in December 2003 adopted the first 
European Security Strategy (ESS) in the aftermath of these events. This strategy was a 
signal that the EU was much more concerned about its security than before. Key threats 
for the EU were identified: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
terrorism, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime. Some of these threats are 
prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. Violent regional conflicts, terrorism, failing states, but 
also other issues like mass migration, it was realized, could pose direct or indirect threats 
to the EU.  
The fourth development shaping the EU’s relation towards sub-Saharan Africa 
was the initiation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. It 
became a pivotal element in the second pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), with a need of close coordination with the other two pillars, the 
European Communities, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The second pillar, 
established in 1992, enabled the EU to act as a single entity in foreign affairs for the first 
time. But defense issues were excluded from cooperation until 1999. ESDP evolved 
significantly in a short time period. The intra-institutional changes affected the relations 
with sub-Saharan Africa. The EU began to create capacities to act in crises and to gain 
more leverage for effective action that was now available for crisis management in 
Africa.  
After the founding phase until 2003 when the European Security Strategy was 
published and the EU launched its first missions, ESDP made further progress. Most of 
these improvements increased the EU’s capacities for civil-military crisis management. 
The EU became more active as sixteen completed or ongoing ESDP missions since 2003 
demonstrate. The EU conducted its first ESDP military crisis management operation in 
sub-Saharan Africa in 2003: it deployed troops to Bunia in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) to protect the local civilian population.  
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Thus, the EU evolved since 1990s from an organization focusing for decades on 
economic issues to an entity with global aspirations in all political fields. This of course 
had repercussions on its policies towards all world regions, including sub-Saharan Africa. 
Since 1989/90, the EU’s Africa policy experienced a threefold change: first, the 
perception of the region changed profoundly – from a mere poverty-stricken region to a 
security concern; second, the instruments of the EU increased – from mere development 
aid to peace support missions, both civilian and military; third, the willingness to engage 
grew – from low-key humanitarian engagement to peace building on the verge to 
peacemaking. And this is just a snapshot of a process that is still ongoing. 
B. THE EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER: IT’S CONCEPTS UNTIL THE 
MID-1990S 
The EU can look back on a long period of interaction with sub-Saharan Africa. 
The relation during the Cold War was determined by the ideological rivalry of the 
Western, anti-communist bloc and the Soviet Union. Both sides supported regimes to 
maintain and increase their influence in Africa independently of the political, moral or 
legal quality of the African regimes. The end of the East-West confrontation has changed 
significantly the EU’s policy toward SSA, which became more multifaceted and 
comprehensive. The EU was now able to care more about the political quality of the 
regimes it dealt with. It henceforth linked “peace, stability, development and respect for 
human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and good governance [with its] 
cooperation and development policies towards Africa.”35 
Gorm Rye Olsen argues that the end of the Cold War opened a window of 
opportunity for the EU to increase its independent actions in external relations and 
exercise its influence on a global scale in order to “become a prominent actor on the 
international scene.” He states that the traditional EU policy goal toward SSA, the 
“promotion of economic and social development,” lost much of its importance during the 
1990s. He observed a decline in development funds provided by the EU to SSA and 
                                                 
35 Faria, “Crisis Management,” 31 
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argues that this is an indicator of the decreasing importance of that topic for the EU.36 
The author claims that this assessment is outdated and will present that the EU increased 
significantly its financial developmental support for sub-Saharan Africa in the last years. 
C. MID-1990S TO 2003: CONCEPTS FOR CRISIS PREVENTION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
Olsen’s “window of opportunity” was closed in the mid 1990s. The EU was now 
confronted with serious problems in SSA: the failure of the UN peacekeeping operation 
UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993-95) and the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 were 
appalling wake-up calls that economic and developmental support alone is not sufficient 
to stabilize SSA or even to hinder crises from emerging.37 These incidents functioned as 
exogenous factors, which stimulated the transformation of the EU’s policy and structure. 
The normative focus on development, despite its linkage to conditions such as good 
governance, respect of human rights etc., was insufficient to prevent brutal civil wars or 
at least to stop ongoing conflicts – the awareness of a need for crisis management 
capabilities rose. However, due to the fact that the EU had no common security and 
defense policy until 1999, and hence no common means for intervention, its foreign 
policy was still focused on political, economic or financial instruments. As a matter of 
necessity, the EU focused much more on the prevention of the root causes of conflicts 
than on meeting imminent crises.  
The first important EU documents coping with crises in Africa were published in 
1995 and 1996.38 Solving conflicts violently is principally rejected by the EU because 
they contradict the basic ideals of the EU. The European Commission expressed in 1996 
that 
                                                 
36 Olsen, “Challenges,” 425-426. 
37 Bauer, “Peace Building,” 10; Olsen, “Challenges,” 431. 
38 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council on Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict 
Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. Brussels, December 04, 1995, http://ec.europa.eu/development/ 
body/theme/prevention/conclusions-1995.htm (accessed March 15, 2007); Commission for the European 
Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and 
Beyond. SEC(96)332, Brussels, March 06, 1996, http://aei.pitt.edu/4280/01/002318_1.pdf (accessed May 
22, 2007). 
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the European Union is heavily concerned by the issue of conflicts in 
Africa. This is not only because the international discussion necessitates 
an adequate response of the Union, not merely because of the moral 
obligation to reduce human suffering, nor simply the obligation to use its 
resources in the most meaningful way. For the European Union, the 
existence of violent conflicts in Africa is increasingly challenging the 
achievement of its declared policy goals. Fostering peace, stability, 
democracy and human rights under the conditions of conflicts is a nearly 
impossible task.39  
The Council emphasized, like the Commission, that the EU’s commitment to 
Africa is not guided alone by self interest, its actions are also directed by a moral 
obligation to improve the living conditions of Africans in general. It stated that:  
independent of the historical and particular links between EU Member 
States and African States, peace, stability and sustainable development, as 
well as respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance in Africa are of interest and relevance to the Union for reasons 
of preserving peace and strengthening international security, as well as for 
humanitarian reasons. The international community, and particularly the 
Union, cannot remain indifferent to events in Africa. The commitment of 
the EU to Africa is based on shared interests, values and objectives: a wish 
to help Africa to achieve peace, stability and sustainable development in 
order to improve the quality of life of its people.40 
The two quotations clearly state that the EU was willing to act as a norm diffuser 
in Africa. 
1. EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crises  
The European Commission declared in 1996 that:  
the means available to the European Union are limited compared to the 
magnitude of the task of effectively preventing, managing and resolving 
conflicts in Africa. The Union should aspire to maximise its leverage 
through an optimal use of its instruments and resources. Therefore, the 
European Union should develop a comprehensive and pro-active approach 
… This approach should be pro-active because the European Union, 
                                                 
39 Commission for the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa, 1. 
40 Council of the European Union, Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, Luxembourg, June 2, 
1997, Annex, paragraph 3, http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/theme/prevention/j2-conclusions-
1997.htm (accessed March 15, 2007). 
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without prejudging the basic principle that Africans are primarily 
responsible for handling the issue of violent conflicts, has not only an 
important interest but also an important potential for actively addressing 
this issue.41 
The EU’s basic concept regarding conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa is 
comprehensive and covers the whole conflict cycle, including conflict prevention, 
conflict management, peace-building, and conflict resolution. However, the range of 
options is effectively limited due to the availability of means.  
This concept is visualized in Figure 1. It shows four conflict situations a country 
could face, the political aims of the EU and the instruments the EU is willing to employ 
to handle the situation.42 
Situation without obvious Tensions
County is seemingly stable and quiet
Immediate Aims: Peace building & establishment of
viable political and socio-economic structures
Instruments: e.g. “targeted assistance” incl. training, education, 
human and social development, democracy building, 
good governance, civil society, institution building 
Situation of Tensions
Conflict in society become clearly apparent
Immediate Aims: Conflict prevention, reduction of tensions, 
prevention of full outbreak of hostilities
Instruments: e.g. Political dialogue with parties concerned, 
(missions, preventive diplomacy); advocacy of specific 
measures (incl. preventive deployment of troops), 
deployment of observers, (threat of) sanctions; own and 
contribution to other humanitarian / emergency aid.  
Open Conflict
Immediate Aim I: Conflict Management: reducing the threat of 
escalation 
Instruments: Threat of sanctions, political dialogue, humanitarian / 
emergency aid (advocacy of preventive military 
intervention, observer missions
Immediate Aim II: Conflict Resolution: Ending the hostilities and 
starting peace negotiations
Instruments: Sanctions, political dialogue, advocacy of specific 
solution, support of peace initiatives (advocacy of peace-
enforcement) 
Conflict Solution
Situation where no longer organized armed violence occur
Immediate Aims: Conflict resolution / peace building; successful 
peace negotiations, return to normality
Instruments: Demobilizing and disarmament, repatriation and re-
integration, de-mining, post-conflict relief and 
humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, peace building measures, 
political dialogue, advocacy of specific solutions, watching 
changes, confidence building measures, (support for) 






Figure 1.   EU’s Peace Building Activities in Africa43 
                                                 
41 Commission for the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa, 2. 
42 Ibid., 4-5. 
 20
Michael Bauer labels short and medium term conflict prevention as “process 
oriented prevention” with the aim to influence the potential or actual conflict parties, to 
reduce or reverse conflict escalation and to, enable communication and support crisis 
solution. Operational prevention is synonymous for process oriented prevention. A wide 
spectrum of instruments could be used to support process oriented conflict prevention: 
official diplomacy could mediate or arrange peace conferences. Informal diplomacy 
could organize workshops, conduct private mediation, or support local arbitrators. 
Positive inducements, like offering most-favored-nation treatment, as well as negative 
sanctions, like imposing embargos, can be adopted in the political and economic realm. 
Preventive military measures, like the deployment of troops, are also supporting process 
oriented prevention.44 
The Commission’s term “peace-building” is defined by Bauer as “structural 
oriented prevention” of conflicts with the aim to engage the root causes of crises. Could 
the root causes be solved, then the potential for crises would be reduced.45 Structural 
prevention is a medium and long term approach with the aim to eliminate conflict laden 
conditions by guaranteeing security, maintenance of the state monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force, economic and social stability, legitimacy, rule of law and justice. Structural 
prevention needs, therefore, a variety of instruments and policies which comprises the 
promotion of human rights, security-sector reform, economic and financial support, 
reform of political, judicative and administrative institutions, political participation, 
democratization and the support of the civil society.46 
The core problem for the EU concerning possible actions in conflict and peace in 
the mid-1990s was that it had no means at its disposal to intervene as a “hard power.” 
The peace building activities possible did not include the deployment of any kind of 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 Figure drawn by the author based on: Commission for the European Communities, The EU and the 
Issue of Conflicts in Africa, 4-5. 
44 Bauer, “Peace Building,” 14. 
45 Post-conflict peace-building is a term used by Boutros Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace and 
comprises measures to consolidate peace if necessary after a conflict has been terminated by a 
“comprehensive agreement”.  
46 Bauer, “Peace Building,” 14. 
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military or police force. Those assets are, though, important, if not decisive, in times of 
tension and conflict. The EU had to rely on other international organizations like the 
United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the West 
European Union (WEU), or even its Member States. 
2. The Concept of Structural Stability 
In 1996, the European Commission summarized the “ultimate policy goal for 
activities concerning conflicts in Africa” as “structural stability.” Five years later, in 
2001, this was again the core concept of a policy paper by the European Commission. 
Characteristics of “structural stability” are:  
sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human 
rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental 
conditions, with the capacity to manage change without [having] to resort 
to violent conflict.47 
The concept of structural stability assumes that societies which can create and 
sustain the mentioned factors are able to solve conflicts without the resort to violent 
means. The elements of structural stability are illustrated in Figure 2. 
                                                 
47 Commission for the European Communities, The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa, 2. 
 22
Capacity to Manage Change 
without to Resort on Violent Conflict
Sustainable Economic Development
Democracy






Figure 2.   Elements of Structural Stability48 
This concept comprises the elements the EU Commission identified as the 
necessary conditions to establish stability. Major drawbacks in one of these elements are 
sufficient to destabilize societies and create tensions that could erupt in violence. The 
implementation of this “ultimate policy goal” is a real challenge for the EU because it 
consists of vague categories which are, by themselves, difficult to define and to measure. 
As a consequence, it is difficult to devise suitable policies and means to realize this aim. 
Another problem is that most elements first of all fall into the responsibility of local 
governments – African ownership is obvious. The EU can foster these conditions only 
indirectly by influencing African governments via incentives or sanctions. The EU will 
                                                 
48 Figure drawn by the author based on: Commission for the European Communities, The EU and the 
Issue of Conflicts in Africa, 2. 
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not run an African economy by itself or organize healthy environmental conditions. This 
does remain the task for the Africans themselves.49 
3. Tackling the Root Causes of Violent Conflict 
Closely connected to the model of structural stability is the European 
Commission’s approach of structural prevention. The Commission declared in 1996 that:  
no amount of humanitarian aid and no effective peace-keeping operation 
will solve a crisis of peace and security, justice and resources in a 
sustainable way, there is a need to try to go beyond ad-hoc decisions and a 
policy of damage limitation.50 
The European Council focused its attention on the root causes of violent conflict 
already in 1997:  
In other parts of Africa, however, violent conflicts have undermined 
development [the realm of the European Community] and have resulted in 
a serious deterioration of the living standards of the population. These 
violent conflicts, more often than not intrastate rather than interstate, have 
multiple causes and take many forms. Ethnic, cultural and religious factors 
often combine with weak social, economic and political structures, rapid 
socio-economic transition, inequality and environmental degradation. If 
the root causes of conflicts are to be tackled successfully, then political 
and socio-economic imbalances, insufficient respect for human rights, as 
well as lack of effective democratic government, freedom of press and free 
flow of information must be addressed. Effective mechanisms and 
institutions for the peaceful reconciliation of divergent interests need to be 
developed, including legitimate and accountable state structures and 
vibrant civil societies.51 
Javier Solana, the High Representative of CFSP, personally addressed the root 
causes of violence conflicts in Africa: 
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Many regions – especially in Africa – are caught in a cycle of conflict, 
insecurity, and poverty. Regional conflicts fuel the demand for 
proliferation. Violent religious extremism is linked to the pressures of 
modernisation, and to the alienation of young people in societies, which 
are experiencing social, cultural and political crisis.52 
As accepted in the concept of structural stability, conflicts are inevitable in human 
society. The occurrence of intrastate violence is a symptom of the incapability to solve 
conflicts in a constructive way. Laurie Nathan states that four structural conditions are the 
root causes of violence: these conditions are “authoritarian rule; the exclusion of 
minorities from governance; socio- economic deprivation combined with inequity; and 
weak states that lack the institutional capacity to manage normal political and social 
conflict.”53  
D. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SECURITY  
International security has changed drastically since the Cold War ended in 1989, a 
development which has altered the EU Member States’ perception of their own security. 
Until that historical event, the security assessment of the EU Member States, regardless 
their parallel membership in the NATO or their status as neutrals, was determined by the 
existence of a reasonable threat: the existence of the Warsaw Pact under the tight control 
of the Soviet Union und its assumed aggressive ideology. Security was primarily defined 
“in military terms and concerned primarily with the national security of the territorial 
state.”54  
First steps concerning the development of a common foreign policy of the EU had 
been made prior to this fundamental change in the international system. Major 
developments in that realm have happened since 1989, but, again, additional external 
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shocks were necessary to shape the EU Member States’ position towards a real Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CFFP), respectively a Common European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). 
The hopes of many citizens, politicians and political scientists were that with what 
Fukuyama ambivalently termed the “end of history,”55 a peaceful international society 
could emerge out of the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and 
the de-legitimization of the communist doctrine. But this hope was illusionist: the 
outbreak of the Balkans wars and also the humanitarian disasters in Sierra Leone and 
Somalia, as well as the genocide in Rwanda56 showed the EU that they had neither the 
adequate political institutions nor the means to solve those problems in its close 
neighborhood. The culmination of that crisis had been the war in Kosovo in 1999 that 
could only be solved with the recourse to NATO.  
The European experience of helplessness in Kosovo changed the EU Member 
States minds concerning a more comprehensive security and defense policy. The British-
French St. Malo Summit in December 1998 set the course for the EU decision to start 
ESDP in June 1999. The obvious lack of coherence and capabilities was unacceptable for 
the EU in the long run. The EU drew the conclusion that it needed effective procedures 
and instruments for crisis management to be capable to handle future crises.  
In subsequent Council Meetings, the MS decided to develop the necessary 
institutions and capabilities. The military Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) was adopted in 
Helsinki in December 1999. The EU Member States agreed to create a military force of 
50,000 to 60,000 troops, which should be deployed within 60 days after the decision to 
launch an operation and which should have a sustainability of one year. They also 
established three new bodies within the EU structure: the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS).  
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The unity of the EU came under enormous pressure in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: the EU Member States were unable to find a 
common position toward the U.S. engagement in Iraq. To add insult to injury, the two 
peacemakers of the EU, France and Great Britain, found themselves in opposite camps. 
Great Britain supported the U.S. operation in Iraq and sent its own contingent into the 
battle, while France rejected any military operation against the country.  
Under these circumstances, the European Security Strategy aimed both inward 
towards bridging the intra-European gap that had evolved and outward formulating 
common principles on how to act worldwide, also against the U.S. The central leitmotif 
of the ESS is that Europe experienced peace and prosperity in the second half of the 20th 
century. This period of peace is not a result of fortune, rather, it is the result of integration 
and cooperation within the EU; rule of law and democracy are necessary conditions for 
peace on the continent. In its self estimation, the economic capability and the number of 
more than 450 million citizens qualifies the EU to play a global role: “Europe should be 
ready to share in the responsibility for global security.” This statement shows that not 
only the protection of the Member States against rising threats is in the focus of the ESS. 
The strategy also includes a self-imposed responsibility for a better world and the clear 
declaration of the EU’s will “to promote its values” to establish security as a prerequisite 
for development.57  
1. EU’s Interests in Crisis Management  
The threat of interstate war in the bipolar world and of military invasion of 
Western Europe from the East has given way to more diffuse threats which have the 
potential capability of challenging the EU Member States in the future. The challenges  
are so complex that they cannot be solved by a single actor. Cooperation in the realm of 
security is the EU’s preferred way to handle the challenges. 
The EU is deeply enmeshed in an interdependent world. Europe’s welfare is 
dependent on a global market. The import of goods, many of its vital resources, as well as 
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the export of European manufactured goods is vulnerable to violent conflict. 
Globalization makes the world smaller. Internal conflicts, diseases, economic decline and 
poverty can evolve into threats for the EU, whether they are direct or indirect. The EU is 
willing to face the threats abroad. Africa specifically though is not addressed very 
prominently in the ESS, it is mentioned only six times, used to illustrate the tragic fate of 
its people. The ESS states that sub-Saharan Africa  
is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, the failure of 
economic growth has been linked to political problems and violent 
conflict. In some parts of the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, a 
cycle of insecurity has come into being.58 
During the Cold War, “security was defined in military terms and was concerned 
primarily with the national security of the territorial state.” This concept, picked up by the 
realist school of International Relations, is connected with the security dilemma and other 
problems states may face in an anarchic international system.59  However, the classical 
definition of security has changed. The ESS mentions five “key threats” to European 
security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state 
failure and organized crime. Terrorist attacks are more likely to pose a threat to the EU 
Member States than a “classical” military attack from any of its neighbors. The terrorist 
threat will become more critical if there is the danger that terrorists have access to 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
a) EU’s Concept of Security 
A substitute for the Realist definition of security is the concept of 
“comprehensive security.” Roots of insecurity could be poverty, unequal distribution of 
power, economic decline, ethnic, religious or nationalist extremism; or even 
environmental degradation, critical population growth combined with limited availability 
of resources, violations of human rights, terrorism, organized crime and proliferation of 
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WMD.60 This was always the case, but the insight was marginalized during the Cold War 
due to the overwhelming mental effect of bipolarity. Security for the EU now comprises 
not only national survival, but also the stable functioning of a government, acceptable 
living conditions of the citizens and economic welfare and growth.  
Biscop and Arnould claim that there is a specific European approach 
towards security: the Union is acting on the assumption that the provision of “global 
public goods” (GPG) is the key for international security. The characteristic of public 
goods is that no one can be excluded from their consumption. Global public goods are 
identical to those public goods “that the state provides at the national level – or is rightly 
expected to provide – to its citizens” and consist at least of  
• physical security or ‘freedom from fear;’  
• political participation, the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms;  
• an open and inclusive economic order that provides for the wealth of 
everyone –  or ‘freedom from want;’  
• social wellbeing in all of its aspects – access to health, to education, to a 
clean and hazard-free environment, etc.61  
Compared to the earlier mentioned model of structural stability, the 
concept of global public goods comprises the same characteristics and, despite the fact 
that the GPG concept is mostly associated with developmental issues, it became relevant 
for security matters.62 Although the ESS is not using the term GPG, it is expressing the 
concept: 
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Spreading good governance, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, 
establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means 
of strengthening the international order.63 
Good governance has been defined by the EU as “the transparent and 
accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the 
purposes of equitable and sustainable development.”64 
Biscop and Arnould argue that the division of mankind into “haves” or 
“have-nots” in respect to the access to global public goods is the “ultimate systemic threat 
to Europe’s security.” The exclusion of people from public goods can result in “political 
instability, extremism and violence, economic unpredictability and massive migration 
flows” which could be uncontrollable at a certain level of inequality. 65 As a result, the 
“political upheaval, extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and migration flows 
will become uncontrollable – as Europe already experienced once, in the 1930s.”66 
Regarding this proposition, European security is dependent on the political, social, 
ecological and economic conditions in its closer and also more remote neighborhood. 
Most distant events do not threaten the EU directly but “negative spillover effects” could 
have the capability to do so.67 Olsen argues in a similar way: he states that the EU has 
“special … security interests in weak post colonial states because … it is exposed to 
turmoil and general instability.” Because these factors can pose a threat to the EU, it “is 
in the EU’s … interest to prevent turmoil, conflicts and general instability in sub-Saharan 
Africa.”68 Stefan Mair came to the same conclusion. There is no guarantee that the 
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effects of state failure, repression, lack of economic prospects, social impoverishment and 
excessive violence on African states could be limited in the long run to this continent.69 
As earlier mentioned, the EU’s engagement in African conflicts was not 
focused on the prevention of threats emerging in sub-Saharan Africa; it has to be seen in 
the context of a general normative approach of the Union to shape the world, within its 
capabilities, into a better environment for humankind. The EU is willing to cope with this 
vision and to intervene in conflicts in Africa with the ultimate goal of structural 
stability.70 
b) EU’s Model to Improve Its Security  
The EU repeatedly emphasizes that peace and security are essential for 
development, but this could also be reversed. On the one hand, security is the prerequisite 
for development; on the other hand, development can increase the people’s access to 
global public goods and in doing so, reduce the causes of insecurity for the EU. 
Figure 3 visualizes this concept. The defect in global governance, the 
denied access to global public goods and the growing gap between those “who have and 
those who have not” can cause the key threats mentioned in the ESS. These threats can 
have direct effects on the EU’s security, especially the proliferation of WMD or 
terrorism, but they can also threaten the EU indirectly through regional conflict, state 
failure or organized crime. The latter three threats can spill over into the EU because of 
increasing interdependence in a “globalized” world.  
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Figure 3.   Causes for the European Union’s insecurity71 
This concept offers international actors two possibilities to increase their 
security: either the EU concentrates on eliminating the immediate key threats by means 
of short-term crisis management (operational crisis prevention) which is the predominant, 
conventional approach; or, with a more long-term vision, it can try to tackle the root 
causes of insecurity (structural prevention), which does not end once violence has broken 
out, but actually covers the whole conflict cycle. 
It should be noted, though, that this diagram has its limits. The difficulty is 
that the EU itself is not only affected by the five security problems, but that it itself 
contributes to the root causes of crisis and insecurity, e.g. through its economic policy  
 
 
                                                 
71 Figure drawn by the author. 
 32
and the spill-over effects of globalization to the local African economy. This issue is 
emphasized by the critical anti-globalization movements and is repeatedly in the focus of 
the media during G8 summits.  
Also, the broad definition of security is not unchallenged. Hyde-Price, for 
example, warns against a too diffuse definition of security and classifies security in a two 
step approach: first, its primary focus has to remain about “conflict between discrete 
political communities” and second, “the causes of war and the conditions for peace.”72 
The comprehensive security concept is also beyond the definition of security of 
Wallander and Keohane. Acknowledging that there are many broader concepts they 
define security strategies more narrow than the ESS does, as:  
measures to protect the territorial integrity of states from the adverse use 
of military force, efforts to guard state autonomy against the political 
effects of potential use; and policies designated to prevent the emergence 
of situations that could lead to the use of force against one’s territory or 
vital interests.73  
Comprehensive security is multi-dimensional according to the EU. In 
order to cope with its full spectrum, the EU has established a concept which comprises of 
an 
overall approach in using civilian and military means to respond 
coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks such as 
conflict prevention, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization.74 
The ESS is based on the theory of “democratic peace”, arguing that the 
“best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.”75 This 
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concept alleges that democratic states, though they are not peaceful in principle, do not 
fight wars against each other. Bruce Russett provides evidence that there “were no wars 
between democracies” and also that it “is tempting to believe that a norm against the use 
of force between democracies, and even the threat of use of force, has emerged and 
strengthened over time.”76 Despite the fact that this seems to be a probabilistic argument, 
Russett and Oneal supplement this theory with the statement that “democracy must rest 
on a foundation of prosperity and that the economic well-being of … countries depends 
on stable, cooperative economic relations among themselves and others.” Their concept 
argues, based on the “Kantian Triangle,” that the three factors of democracy, economic 
interdependence and international organizations interact and thus promote peace.77 This 
proposition helps to explain why the EU supports democracy as an instrument to increase 
its security. 
2. EU’s Strategic Security Objectives 
As outlined in the ESS, the EU pursues three strategic objectives. The first is 
addressing the mentioned threats. Second, the EU recognizes that geography matters; 
thus, the EU is especially concerned about the security situation in its neighborhood. The 
EU wants to establish a well-governed ring of countries around its borders to keep threats 
away from its territory. The question is, where does the European neighborhood end? 
Though the European Neighborhood Policy, that was formulated subsequently, does only 
include the North African states (besides the Middle Eastern and East European states), 
Klaus-Dieter Schwarz alleges that sub-Saharan Africa should also belong to it. However, 
neighborhood or not, the ESS is a strategy with global aspirations and sub-Saharan Africa  
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is not neglected.78 Third, the EU has the strategic aim to strengthen the international 
order, which is to be “based on effective multilateralism.” The meaning and realization of 
this concept is analyzed later.  
One of the EU’s priorities is to “strengthen the UN, equipping it to fulfil its 
responsibilities and to act effectively.”79 Institutionalized cooperation for the EU is the 
result of the positive development of Western Europe in the last 50 years. The EU wants 
“international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to 
international peace and security”. It is specifically mentioning the UN, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and regional organizations outside Europe like the African Union (AU). Because 
of its belief that the quality of international society – a concept borrowed from Hedley 
Bull and the English School – depends on the quality of individual governments, the EU 
wants to promote good governance. In other words, “international relations should be 
organized through strong, negotiated and enforceable multilateral regimes.”80 
3. Policy Implications Derived from the European Security Strategy 
The EU is willing to deal with a crisis in all its phases, and tries to create 
conditions that are favorable to peaceful conflict management and hinder conflicts from 
turning violent. However, the EU is willing to use military force as a means of last resort 
to intervene in conflicts, as a resolution of the EU Council gives evidence:  
Aware that peace and security are closely interlinked with political, 
institutional and socio-economic development and respect for democratic 
principles and fundamental human rights, the Council holds that an 
effective policy of conflict prevention and resolution necessitates a 
coherent mix of political, economic, developmental, social and  
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environmental instruments including, where appropriate, military means. 
Regarding the latter, the EU has with a clear preference for non-military 
preventive actions.81 
The ESS outlines policy implications for Europe. The Union, it is argued, should 
be more active, more capable and more coherent. Its policies should be conducted 
cooperatively with partners. What does this imply? 
First, the EU must be more coherent in the use of its available instruments and 
capabilities. The ESS states that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any 
be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.”82 In other 
words, coherence is necessary because different tasks have to be fulfilled by civilian and 
military means which are at the ESDP’s disposal. To complicate matters further, some 
means are under the control of the European Community, i.e. the Commission (first 
pillar), some under the control of CFSP/ESDP, i.e. the European Council and its 
Secretariat (second pillar). Civil-Military Operations (CMOs) thus require not only intra-, 
but also inter-pillar coordination. The different political agendas of the Commission and 
the Council have to be streamlined and coordinated to increase the effectiveness in crisis 
prevention and management; this should be supported by coherent regional policies 
which include the regional actors in conflict resolution. 
The second implication of the ESS is that the EU needs to become more capable 
in order to fulfill its strategic objectives. This includes the transformation of its military 
“into more flexible, mobile forces” to be better capable to meet the new challenges e.g. 
concerning strategic transport, and the establishment of more civilian resources for crisis 
and post crisis situations. The ESS calls on the MS to prepare for a broad spectrum of 
missions the EU should be capable to fulfill. The ESS took up and refined the Petersberg 
Tasks which are also mentioned in Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union. 
They comprise of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking. Territorial defense of the EU Member States 
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territory is excluded from these tasks.83 In the words of the ESS, the potential mission 
spectrum should comprise joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in 
combating terrorism, and security sector reform (SSR).84 
Third, the EU must be more active since the EU disposes over a wide spectrum of 
effective tools for crisis management, which comprises “political, diplomatic, military 
and civilian, trade and development activities.” Operations which combine two or more 
of these elements are of particular importance. These tools should be used synergetically 
to pursue the strategic objectives. The EU viewed itself over a long time as a “soft 
power” and neglected military affairs. Now the EU is accepting that the military is 
sometimes necessary to back up diplomacy.  
Fourth, the outlined problems and threats cannot be solved by the EU 
autonomously because they have complex causes. The ESS draws the conclusion that 
“multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key 
actors” is the only way to counter the challenges for EU’s security.85  
4. Threat Assessment for Sub-Saharan Africa 
The ESS mentioned five “key threats” for European security: terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and 
organized crime. These key threats vary in their prominence as concerns sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Subsequently, I outline the relevance of these “key threats” for the EU’s security. 
I argue first, that they are not all prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, and secondly, that 
Europe is not threatened directly through regional conflicts and failing states but that the 
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these conflicts could affect Europe in the long term strongly.86 In addition to the “key 
threats,” the effects of illegal migration also have to be taken into account. 
a) Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism 
The proliferation of WMD and terrorism are the most prominent threats 
mentioned in the ESS, the threat is obvious if terrorists could acquire such weapons. 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that any sub-Saharan African state disposes over 
WMD or is going to acquire such weapons.87 The only state that worked on a nuclear 
program, South Africa, abandoned it prior to the collapse of the apartheid regime. 
Terrorism is doubtlessly a direct threat for the EU. EU Member States 
have had experience with terrorist groups in Europe, such as the ETA in Spain, the IRA 
in the United Kingdom, or the RAF in West Germany. Terrorists are challenging the state 
and terrorizing the population. The question is whether internationally operating terrorists 
are hiding in sub-Saharan Africa or not. Scholars and politicians disagree on this topic of 
“safe havens”. International terrorism can be traced to Sudan, whose government 
harbored Osama Bin Laden until May 1996.88 Islamic terrorists committed the bombing 
attacks against the embassies in Kenya; the Unions of Islamic Courts were alleged to 
protect terrorist suspects in Somalia. The breakdown of order in Somalia is a major 
concern, especially for the U.S. administration fearing that Somalia could become a safe 
haven for al-Qaeda terrorists.89 
Despite these terrorist activities and the appearance of suspects in sub-
Saharan Africa, there is no evidence of a “specific African terrorism.”90 Mills argues that 
terrorists in Africa are not global players; the “real terrorist threat on this continent 
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remains internal.”91 In a similar way, Mair states that all the problems and shortfalls 
connected with conflicts, wars, state failure and the root causes of insecurity are not 
sufficient to create globally operating terrorist networks like al Qaeda that had its safe 
haven in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that locally operating terrorists pose a threat to EU 
residents and tourists in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the terrorist attack on the Jewish 
synagogue in Djerba / Tunisia in April 2002, it is not clear how far the EU is directly 
threatened through terrorists operating from that region. 
b) Regional Conflicts 
Conflicts are widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa: most African sub-regions 
are affected by wars, internal strife and / or ethnic conflict. To give only a few examples: 
In West Africa conflicts arose in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia. In Central 
Africa the epidemic conflict in the DRC is obvious, especially at its eastern border. The 
Great Lakes Region is torn by rebel movements and ethnic violence involving Rwanda, 
Burundi and Uganda. The Horn of Africa is another restless region. Cross border wars 
between Ethiopia and Somalia, the echo of the independence war of Eritrea, the collapse 
of Somalia and the brutal internal conflicts in Sudan’s south and west (Darfur) are only a 
few examples of the omnipresence of violence in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. These 
conflicts destroy the fabric of societies, create deep cleavages, and displace millions of 
people in the country, the region or even beyond. Rebels often operate from neighboring 
countries which are unable to hinder them or even support such groups to destabilize 
neighbors. Conflicts in Africa usually do not stop at internationally recognized borders; 
they implicate their neighbors and sometimes the whole region.  
Regional conflicts will not affect Europe’s security directly; there is not 
even a sign that a conflict party will pose a threat to the EU. The military capabilities are 
negligible.92 The most likely threat is that European citizens residing in sub-Saharan 
Africa could be whipsawed by the local conflicts. Military capabilities for non- 
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combatant evacuation operations are held ready by several EU Member States. 
Operations of this kind also belong to the mission spectrum of the new EU Battle Groups. 
However, regional conflicts can create mass migration of refugees and displaced persons. 
Most of them find refuge in neighboring countries but there is the omnipresent possibility 
that they try to seek protection and/or a better life in Europe – a challenge for the 
European societies analyzed later in this thesis. Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are often 
carried out with extreme violence and brutality. The atrocities of the Hutu Interhamwe in 
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s and the Janjaweed militia in Darfur gave evidence of that. Modern media, 
especially the television, can have an important impact on the European public opinion 
and can put great pressure on the European politicians to act in humanitarian disasters, as 
the intervention of NATO in Kosovo in 1999 demonstrated. This military operation was 
in part stimulated by media reports about the killing of civilians by Serbian militias, such 
as the Racak massacre that triggered the intervention. On the other hand, the CNN effect 
seems to decrease in importance with geographic distance. Atrocities in Darfur are well 
documented but up to now the international community has not decided to intervene 
against the will of Sudan’s government.93 
c) Failed States 
In a Western view, a modern state could be defined as an entity which 
comprises three elements: territory, citizens and legal authority. The modern state is 
constituted by the claim of the central authority for political-institutional control about a 
defined territory and the inhabiting population. States have to be acknowledged by the 
international community.94  
Failing states are those internationally recognized entities which exist in 
defined borders, inhabited by a population, but without a functioning central authority, 
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respectively an authority which cannot exercise its power over the two other elements.95 
In addition, failed states are characterized by these symptoms: state institutions are 
unable to manage their central or core functions, unable to provide security for their 
citizens and unable to control their territory; the guaranty of law and order is not feasible, 
nor are the provisions of physical infrastructure and basic supplies of public health care 
and education.96 The lack of rule and law compromises the legitimacy of the government, 
participation of the population in decisions and the quality of the judiciary.97 
To differentiate the capacity deficit in the realm of state authority, Gero 
Erdmann developed the “Apocalyptic Trias” model which comprises three elements: state 
failure, state decline and state disintegration.98 Erdmann argues that nearly all African 
states are threatened by state failure. This includes, for example, the collapse of the 
public health or education system, deterioration of existing infrastructure, increase of 
criminality and corruption. State decline is defined as a situation in which the state has 
lost its authority over parts of its territory. State functions are substituted and privatized. 
The third category, state disintegration, is defined as the collapse of the entire state 
authority. This could be limited territorially, and be partial state disintegration, or total 
disintegration of state authority, like what happened in Somalia in the 1990s. State failure 
is one of the biggest concerns in the ESS: “State failure undermines global governance 
and adds to regional instability.” The ESS warns that “state failure and organized crime 
spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa.”99 
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Failing states are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. The Failed States Index, 
established by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, mentioned in July 2005 twelve 
sub-Saharan African countries within the list of the 20 most instable states.100 Figure 4 




Figure 4.   The Failed State Index (Extract for Africa)102 
 
 
                                                 
100 These countries are: Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, 
Chad, Liberia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Burundi and Central African Republic. 
101 The colors represent the results of the assessment: Red colored countries are critical, orange in 
danger, beige at the borderline. Black colored countries are not categorized as failed states. 
102 Failed State Index by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/ 
cms.php?story_id=3098 (accessed May 22, 2007). 
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Failing and failed states are a concern for the EU because this weakness 
could be exploited by criminals. The ESS warns that as “states fail, organized crime take 
over.” Failed states can lead to “humanitarian tragedies,” that could cause serious 
concerns in Europe’s public opinion. The worst case for the EU’s security would be, as 
the ESS alleges, the concurrence of failed states, terrorism and WMD.103  
The connection between failed states and terrorism is repeatedly 
mentioned in scholarly articles, as well as in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2002.104 
The case of Afghanistan is evidence that international terrorists could use a failed state as 
a residue area.105 Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, “state collapse and 
state failure were seen chiefly as humanitarian tragedies.”106 After that incident they have 
become a security concern. Nevertheless, the link between failed states and terrorism is 
not without controversy. Simmons and Tucker argue contrary “to a common held view, 
[that] significant numbers of international terrorists do not come from failed states. Nor 
do failed states house many organizations that support terrorism.”107 Their argument is 
supported by Mills, who alleges that “there is no exact correlation between state 
weakness or failure and terrorist activity.”108  
The EU is trying to stabilize and rebuild failing / failed states not only 
because of humanitarian and security concerns, but also because states are the building 
blocks of the international order, and well-functioning ones are in themselves goals for 
the EU. As concerns failing states, Africa indeed is the main focus of the ESS. 
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d) Organized Crime and Warlords  
Most African conflicts are of low intensity and fought with small arms. 
Warlords try to secure and control resources and markets to enrich themselves, to pay off 
clients as their power basis or to procure supply for their militias. In order to guarantee 
access to resources and markets, warlords sometimes operate across borders, causing 
violence that can affect whole regions. Due to the fact that continuing the conflict 
guarantees the extraction of vital resources, these warlords have no interest in conflict 
termination. The “war economy” is incompatible with good governance and the rule of 
law. These interests are important in the conflicts in West Africa.   
The trade of African gemstones, the infamous “Blood Diamonds,” and 
timber by warlords can fuel regional conflicts and are such as in the case of Sierra Leone 
necessary condition for the rebels to procure weapons and ammunition. African warlords, 
leaders of militias and rebel commanders are integral elements of organized crime, 
partially with global links.109 Organized crime is seen primarily as a threat for the 
internal order of a state. Criminals try to realize gains and to seek influence and power in 
politics and / or economy through illegal means, including violence. Gains from illegal 
trade are used to manipulate and bribe decision makers in the public sphere.  
Organized crime in sub-Saharan Africa is first of all a problem for the 
states in which the criminal groups are operating. However, organized crime affects 
directly European interests in several respects. First, it takes advantage of the demand of 
the industrialized world for high value luxury goods, commodities and raw material to 
finance their illegal business or interests. Second, it helps to sustain local and or regional 
conflicts – a fundamental contradiction to the EU’s interests. Third, organized crime has 
to launder the illegal acquired money in Europe or elsewhere which could have an impact 
on the internal security of the EU Member States. The most threatening scenario for the 
EU, though, would be the participation of globally operating terrorist organizations in the  
 
 
                                                 
109 Mair, “Konfliktpotentiale,” 111. 
 44
illegal trade of goods. Their aim is to get money to finance terrorist attacks. There is 
some evidence that al Qaeda is involved in the illegal trade of diamonds in sub-Saharan 
Africa for that purpose.110 
e) Migration 
Despite the fact that migration is not mentioned in the ESS, the problems 
connected with this issue are very important for European domestic politics, even though 
migration is not a security threat. The deterioration of living conditions by civil war, 
ethnic conflict, and bad governance raises the incentives or even force Africans to leave 
their home; many of them try to find a better future for themselves and their relatives in 
Europe. Migration toward the EU has become a political problem. 
Illegal immigration is a very sensitive topic for European societies, 
connected with prejudices but also with the fear of EU citizens being alienated in their 
own country through massive immigration. Hundreds of thousands have already been 
naturalized in Italy, Spain and elsewhere. The expenses for asylum seekers in terms of 
housing, social security and legal expenses are enormous. Vice versa, emigration is a 
mixed blessing for sub-Saharan African states. On the one hand, expatriates who are able 
to earn money abroad can subsidize their families at home. On the other hand, if 
educated, skilled people emigrate. This “brain drain” is a major cause for economic 
decline. To put it simply, African medical doctors, living abroad, do not help to improve 
the conditions of the African health care system.  
Migration is a very prominent topic in Europe: continuous news reports 
about African migrants in overcrowded, non-seaworthy boats picked up in the 
Mediterranean Sea or migrants who try to cross the border fences surrounding the 
Spanish enclaves in North Africa leave a distorted view of reality for the European 
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public. Approximately 2,180,000 people born in sub-Saharan Africa were living in the 
EU at the end of 2004, a number which is less than the news media may suppose.111  
f) Conclusion 
The last subchapters presented evidence that the key threats mentioned in 
the ESS exist in sub-Saharan Africa, but they pose neither a threat for the survival of the 
European Union Member States nor for the economic wellbeing of their citizens. But 
conditions in some states of sub-Saharan Africa could affect Europe indirectly. 
Deteriorating conditions in failing states could be exploited by terrorist groups, offering 
e.g. a fertile ground for recruitment. Failing states, regional conflicts and organized crime 
are interdependent. Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is much more threatened than 
European citizens. Conflicts lead to migration but only a few of the migrants manage to 
overcome the well protected European borders. Migration and displacement are first of 
all an intra-African problem. Organized crime can have an impact on Europe’s internal 
security, but no vital interests would be violated. This special type of crime is much more 
the task of criminal investigation departments of the EU Members States and their trade 
policies than for their expeditionary military. 
This assessment is a snap-shot of the current situation. But also over the 
long run the emergence of a military threat in sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely. The 
scholarly discussion concerning terrorism shows that such threats are at least in the realm 
of possibility.  
E. EU’S CONCEPT OF CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND 
RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 
Only one month after the adoption of the ESS, the European Council declared that 
progress in “long term conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives” is the 
“necessary precondition … for the African States to build and sustain capacity to deal 
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effectively with terrorism” and that the EU will try to prevent conflicts by addressing the 
“more structural root causes” of violent conflict.112 
This statement is specified by Javier Solana’s comment in the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) that the “European Union has identified poverty as the main root cause 
of conflict in Africa.” But, he acknowledged that however hard the EU tries, it will be 
difficult to tackle poverty and other root causes successfully: 
Sometimes prevention will fail, so we must also be prepared to manage 
crises. We must be ready to do so in an integrated and coherent manner: 
capable of deploying development aid, and the full range of political, 
economic, financial and, where necessary, military means. The EU is 
making important efforts to equip itself with all the capabilities required to 
effectively manage crises. 113 
Despite the EU’s view of “African ownership” and the importance of conflict 
prevention, the EU is willing to prepare itself “to become involved, whenever necessary, 
in crisis management in Africa with its own capabilities.”114 This is necessary if the EU 
is truly willing to act in all phases of conflict. Each phase has a special character, and 
therefore special capabilities are needed.  
Figure 5 presents the EU’s potential political fields in four stages of conflict based 
on its own publication: 
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Figure 5.   EU’s Policy in Four Stages of Conflict115 
The foundation of the EU’s reputation as a credible player in all phases of conflict 
is connected with its political will and the capabilities the EU is able to deploy. Missions 
where military means were necessary to stop ongoing crises, classical interventions, were 
beyond the EU’s possibilities in the early 1990s. On the one hand, the political will of the 
EU to become a relevant actor in crisis management increased significantly since the 
formal adoption of ESDP as a part of CFSP at the Cologne summit in June 1999. On the 
other hand, the EU had to recognize that its capability to implement its will was more 
than rudimentary and, as it will be presented later, much had to be done to improve this 
weakness. 
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F. EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA (EUSFA) 
Most relevant for our topic the “EU Strategy for Africa,” adopted by the European 
Council on December 16, 2005.116 The strategy can be interpreted as a summary of two 
preceding papers.117 These papers reflect the competences of the two pillars of the EU. 
While the Solana document focuses on the “peace and security aspects of the global 
strategy for Africa”, the Commission paper focuses on developmental aid.118  
Similar to the ESS, the EUSFA is a declaration of the EU’s intents, and outlines 
the challenges for the EU rising out of Africa, and the means the EU is willing to develop 
or to adopt to implement its basic goals. The strategy’s central message is how the EU is 
willing to support Africa in its development. Because of this, the strategy is manifold, 
and it would go beyond the scope of this research to analyze it in every detail.119 In this 
chapter, I will focus on  security issues of the EUSFA and the two preceding documents. 
1. EU’s Strategic Goals Regarding Africa 
The EUSFA provides a detailed analysis of African challenges in geopolitical, 
economic, social and environmental spheres, outlines the principles which guide the 
relationship between the EU and Africa, and presents the EU’s concepts in response to 
the challenges. The strategy shows how the EU is going to act in order to promote its 
aims: the creation of peace and security, the promotion of human rights and democracy, 
economical and social development as well as regional integration and trade. The order of 
this aims in the European Council’s paper implies a sequence of priorities. Fundamental 
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is the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), backing 
“sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa.”120  
The UN MDG, adopted in 2000, comprises eight goals, which are providing 
countries around the world a framework for sustainable development. These goals are the 
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the achievement of universal primary 
education, promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction of child 
mortality, the improvement of maternal health, combat against HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases, the guarantee of environmental sustainability and the development of a 
global partnership for development. The realization of these goals is scheduled for 2015, 
the same timeframe is set for the EUSFA. 
The EUSFA serves, in general, the ESS’s goal to make ESDP more congruent and 
presents the guiding principles of the EU’s foreign policy towards Africa for the next ten 
years. The strategy refers to the whole African continent and proclaims a partnership 
between Africa and the EU. The EU is willing to conduct a three part approach to deal 
with the African problems. This approach comprises first the will to strengthen the “EU 
support in priority areas,”121 second, an increase of “EU financing in Africa” and third, a 
“more effective EU approach.”122 
The EUSFA’s core principles are partnership between Africa and the EU “based 
on international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability. Its underlying 
philosophy is African ownership and responsibility, including working through African 
institutions.”123  
Human rights, the EU’s vision of governance, as well as development assistance, 
are addressed in this strategy. The EU’s focus on institutions is obvious: “Successful 
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development requires adherence to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of 
law, and effective, well governed states, and strong and efficient institutions.”124 Without 
using the term structural stability, the EUSFA is in line with that concept. Security and 
good governance are seen as prerequisites for development. The EU sees regional 
integration and the establishment of common market zones as facilitators of economic 
growth and development. Nevertheless, the EU is aware that the production has to be 
diversified if an exchange of commodities and manufactured goods should be possible. 
Countries with the same variety of commercial goods have few to exchange. Economic 
development also needs much capital investment. The decision to invest in a foreign state 
depends, among other things, on local stability, transparency and accountability of the 
state and security for investment.125  
Solidarity and subsidiarity are also basic principles of the EUSFA. Solidarity 
appeals to the responsibility of all African countries for the improvement of Africa’s own 
situation. Solidarity and African ownership includes, for the EU, working “with the AU, 
sub-regional organizations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate 
conflict.”126 Subsidiarity means that the EU is cooperating with Africa on three levels: 
with the individual countries, the regions, and the continent. Subsidiarity is not only a 
tool to channel developmental aid to different levels; it is also delegating responsibility to 
the lowest possible organizational level. First of all, the state is responsible for the well-
being of its own citizens. If the problems cannot be solved on the country level, then the 
region has to take responsibility. Cross-regional problems and concepts can and have to 
be covered by Africa as one entity.  
Despite the detailed outline of the strategy it is first of all mere declaratory policy. 
Much of its content is still pretty general and the future has to prove how far the EU is 
willing to implement these statements of intent.  
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2. Security Aspects of the Strategy 
Conditions in many African countries and regions are, in general, obstacles for the 
EU’s and the UN’s aim to support the implementation of the MDG until 2015. To remove 
these obstacles, the EU claims to conduct a policy that will set the stage for “attaining the 
MDGs and good governance.” This policy has two sectors; first are measures to “foster 
peace and security” and second are measures to “support legitimate and effective 
governance.” Within each sector the EU identifies specific actions to help implement the 
political aims.127 Because of the importance of both elements, I provide a more detailed 
overview about the two preconditions. 
a) Foster Peace and Security 
In order to promote peace and security, the EU is announcing its will to 
address the root-causes of violent conflict and will promote dialogue, participation and 
reconciliation. The EU appeals for cooperation to tackle common security threats. Non-
proliferation of WMD, and combating terrorism are issues which are not to be solved by 
unilateral EU actions. 
The EU announces that it will continue the provision of “support to 
African led, -owned and implemented peace support operations” through the African 
Peace Facility (APF), which will be sustainably funded. Support will also be granted for 
the development of African military capacities, such as the African Standby Force. Both 
will be introduced later in this thesis. The EU’s approach towards conflict is, though, 
more than financial support and advice. CFSP and ESDP missions should directly 
support the efforts of other organizations to promote peace and stability in Africa. This 
commitment includes “military and civilian crisis management missions, including 
potential deployment of EU Battlegroups.”128  
Post conflict situations should be stabilized through “regional and national 
strategies for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reinsertion (DDRR).” 
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Former combatants, including child soldiers, have to be offered alternatives to conflict in 
a peaceful environment to “break the conflict cycle.” To interrupt conflict cycles, it is 
also important to stop the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as land 
mines in conflict areas.  
In line with its earlier declarations, the EU is stressing the importance of 
post-conflict stabilization of societies. Serving this issue, the EU declared that it will 
“develop a strategy and capacity to foster security sector reform (SSR) in Africa.”129 As 
it is presented later, significant progress has been made up to now. 
b) Support for Effective and Legitimate Governance 
In order to set the second prerequisite for the realization of the MDG, the 
EU is willing to support effective and legitimate governance. The EUSFA argues, like 
many other EU declarations, that there “is a strong linkage between the promotion of 
development and the promotion of democracy.” The EU is aware that: 
democracy cannot be created or imposed by domestic elites or external 
actors … The appropriate role of external actors is therefore instead to 
support and encourage domestic efforts to build, strengthen and sustain 
democratic norms, procedures and institutions.130  
To foster good governance, the EU declared to design special activities in 
Africa. The EU supports the reform of state structures to “build effective and credible 
central institutions,” and to “develop local capacity.” These two fields include the 
promotion of strong central institutions, the enhancement of “respect for human rights, 
freedoms of citizens, good governance and effectiveness of state,” as well as the “support 
for the police and the judiciary system,” the “strengthening of public financial 
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Africa. Furthermore, the EU is supporting decentralization, which includes to “empower 
people,” and guaranteeing “a fair share of income to remain within regions instead of 
being absorbed by the center.”131 
Other major EU activities to support effective and legitimate governance 
are the reinforcement of respect for human rights and democracy, the promotion of 
gender equality, and to fight “corruption and organized crime and promote good 
governance in the financial, tax and judicial area. 132 
G. EU’S SUPPORTIVE CONCEPTS  
1. EU’s Concept for Security Sector Reform  
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a very important issue for the EU in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Two ESDP missions in the DRC are connected with this concept; they are 
examined in the case study. In this chapter the author provides an overview about the 
development of the EU approach, the concept itself, and information about some related 
problems. 
SSR is a relatively new “concept in state transformation, development and post 
conflict peace building. 133 The goal of SSR  
is to reach a situation where the security system is organized in a way 
which ensures an effective Security Sector, the protection of individuals as 
well as of sustainable state institutions, through ensured democratic 
oversight, transparency and accountability in accordance with 
internationally recognised values and standards.134 
The EU used the term SSR in many documents: in 2003, Javier Solana requested 
(in the ESS) the improvement of the EU’s capabilities in different areas and mentioned 
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explicitly supporting third world countries in security sector reform.135 The EU decided 
to set up expert teams which are capable of providing planning support for African 
operations, or to plan and conduct disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
and SSR actions in an EU framework.136 The EUSFA foresaw the development of a 
strategy and capacity for SSR in 2005.137 To conform to these demands, the Commission 
and the Council developed new concepts which were endorsed in July and October 
2005.138 The UK Presidency of the EU conducted, together with the European 
Commission and civil organizations in November 2005, an expert seminar with the topic 
“Developing a Common Security Sector Strategy for the EU.”139 The European 
Commission adopted a “Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector 
Reform” in May 2006.140 Here, the classical dilemma of the EU becomes evident. Both 
pillars developed their own concepts and they are not merged into one overarching 
strategy.  
In general, the SSR describes a reform process which has to be applied “in 
countries whose development is hampered by structural weakness in their security and 
justice sectors and often exacerbated by a lack of democratic oversight.”141 The basic 
guidelines and principles for the SSR were developed by the Organisation for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee and 
accepted by the EU.142 The European Commission, as well as the European Council, 
refers to this basic document in their own statements. The OECD declares that the  
overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure 
environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and 
democracy. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: i) the 
ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to 
generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which people are 
exposed; and ii) the ability of the state to use the range of policy 
instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect 
society’s well-being.143 
Based on this OECD concept, the Commission defines the security system as “all 
state institutions and other entities with a role in ensuring the security of the state and its 
people.” The Commission, as well as the Council, refers explicitly to the OECD paper, as 
it defines which actors in the security sector should be affected by SSR.144 These actors 
are 
• “Core security actors including law enforcement institutions,” such as armed 
forces, police, presidential guards, paramilitary forces, etc. 
• “Security management and oversight bodies,” which comprises the executive 
with all its branches; such as the government, the ministries of defense and 
interior, financial management bodies, such as border and customs sector, etc. 
Also included are the parliament, civil society and NGOs. 
• “Justice and law enforcement institutions,” such as justice ministries, prisons, 
law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, etc. 
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• “Non-statutory security forces,” such as guerillas, private security companies, 
and liberation armies. 
SSR should include all these actors in such a manner that the whole security 
system is “consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance.”145  
Possible scenarios for ESDP support of SSR are identified according to different 
stages of post-conflict situations. In an early stage, DDR of former combatants is one of 
the top priorities. Security in that stage “would likely to be ensured by an external 
military or police presence and political authority might be exercised by an external actor 
for a limited period of time.” In a transition and stabilization phase, the task would be to 
prevent the return of violence; in a stable environment, ESDP support for SSR would 
focus on the development of democratic institutions.146 Possible tasks for ESDP support 
are manifold, they could range from “defining defence policy,” “training the armed 
forces,” “organizing the police sector,” or even the co-location of “experts to national 
ministry of justice to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities.”147 
SSR is obviously a long term project and can be subsumed under the 
Commission’s term “peace building” It is essential in post-conflict societies to create the 
preconditions for a lasting peace, but it is also needed in fragile states which are close to 
an outbreak of conflict. In accordance to the earlier introduced concept of “structural 
oriented prevention,” SSR should engage the root causes of crises in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The implementation of SSR creates favorable conditions for achieving the UN MDG.148  
The implementation of SSR is not an easy task.149 SSR is, in most cases, but 
especially in West and Central Africa, donor driven. The promise of financial support is 
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linked to reforms in the security sector according to Western donor standards and 
guidelines. Without the local will to comply with these guidelines, the chance of 
successful implementation of SSR is problematic. As the EU Council acknowledges, 
African ownership is a necessary prerequisite for success and defined as “the 
appropriation by the local authorities of the commonly agreed objectives and 
principles.”150  
Another factor influencing SSR is the general political condition of the state. The 
realization of SSR during war, open conflict, times of tension, or in failed states, is 
impossible, or at least not very promising.151 The EU Council states that “SSR is a core 
task in countries emerging from conflicts and is a central element of the broader 
institution-building and reform efforts in countries in a more stable environment.”152 The 
first two ESDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR 
Congo, are conducted in such an environment and analyzed later in this thesis. 
An example for EU’s action in support of SSR can be also found in Europe: The 
EU launched the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) in 2003 to reform the local police according West European standards. Similar 
aims are pursued by the EU’s mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) where the EU conducted the operation EUPOL PROXIMA from 2003 to 2005 
and launched the follow-on mission EUPAT after termination of EUPOL PROXIMA. 
2. EU’s Concept for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
DDR is a central element in the stabilization of post-conflict societies: many 
former regular and irregular combatants have to be demobilized, disarmed, and together 
with their families, reintegrated after the settlement of a conflict through a peace 
agreement. The European Council declares that DDR “can constitute a significant pillar 
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of SSR and is regarded as central to conflict resolution and internal stability. In many 
cases, SSR will call for DDR type activities. However, SSR goes well beyond DDR.”153  
The three phases of DDR are defined in the following way by the EU:154 
disarmament “is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often civilians.” 
Demobilization “is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed 
forces or other armed groups.” This process can be separated into two phases; first, troops 
should be assembled in temporary processing facilities and disarmed and then in a second 
step, former combatants and their relatives / dependents should be provided with the 
basic needs for living, prior to their reintegration into the society and economy. This step 
is defined as “reinsertion” by the UN. Reintegration “is the process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.”155 
The implementation of DDR is complex. The offer of DDR can be an instrument 
to facilitate conflict resolution during peace negotiations. Former liberation armies, rebels 
and other fighters usually had a reason to start the armed uprising, these root causes have 
to be addressed before DDR can take place. To have an impact, the DDR programs have 
to be credible.  Simply stated, DDR can interrupt conflict cycles by offering a prosperous 
future to the former combatants and their relatives / dependents. As a question of rational 
choice, former combatants should prefer a promising, peaceful life to violence. But this 
central prerequisite is not easy to provide. Sub-Saharan African post-conflict societies are 
challenged by many problems: former combatants are usually not provided with jobs to 
start a new life; irregular combatants, especially child soldiers, are often alienated by 
atrocities they conducted in their original community and have no place to return; 
warlords have a vested interest in going on to fight and press their militias to do so. There 
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is a great danger that the conflict will start once again if the attempts of appropriate 
reintegration fail. Reintegration is especially dependent on complex social and structural 
preconditions. The local economy must be able to provide former combatants and their 
families the chances to make their living; social reintegration is a question of 
reconciliation, which is especially important for former “child soldiers” who were forced 
to commit atrocities against close neighbors / friends in order to cut social ties. 
The acceptance of DDR is also connected with a serious threat: if rebels and other 
anti-government movements surrender their weapons, it has to be guaranteed that they do 
not suffer retaliation by the government later on. Resurgence of fighting by local militias, 
causing a collapse of peace accords, is thus a widespread phenomenon. 
The European Commission and the European Council acknowledged the 
importance of DDR and approved a joint EU concept of support for Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration in December 2006.156 In this concept, the EU outlines 
its understanding of DDR, possible activities and general principles for EU support to 
DDR. Key actors in the field are the UN and the World Bank, the EU plays only a 
secondary role. Nevertheless, cooperation and coordination between these actors is 
necessary. 
The EU can support DDR in different areas, such as the “strategic planning, and 
setting up the national coordination mechanisms as well as giving support to the 
demobilization and reintegration phase.”157 In general, EU’s support is possible in all 
phases of DDR. This includes short term disarmament and demobilization programs and 
long term reintegration, a task for developmental support by the European Community. 
The EU is capable and willing to support local authorities, and “through a 
military, civilian and or military/civilian operation,” the EU can play a “role as both a 
donor and a political actor.”158 ESDP measures can promote DDR in various ways: 
disarmament can be supported by the provision of advice; EU troops could guarantee a 
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secure environment. ESDP could support demobilization through monitoring and adviser 
teams, conducting “reception, screening, registration and discharge” of former 
combatants, the establishment and operation of cantonment facilities, etc. In the third 
phase, reintegration (and reinsertion) the EU can give “support to ex-combatants, their 
dependents and receiving communities including shelter, food, vocational training, 
education, tools, micro-credits, employment reintegrated opportunities, and addressing 
psychological and physical needs.”159 
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III. INTERINSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION  
One of the EU’s declared aims is the promotion of “effective multilateralism,” 
defined as “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning 
international institutions and a rule based international order.”160 Biscop and Arnould 
equate the term “effective multilateralism” with “global governance, a system that is able 
to ensure that every human being, at the global level, has access to the core public 
goods.”161 Biscop argues that this effective multilateralism is synonymous with “a 
network of multilateral mechanisms and institutions that together manage to provide 
everyone access to the essential GPG or, in other words, effective global governance.”162 
Multilateralism is necessary to handle the global challenges of the early 21st century, 
which are beyond the capacities of a single nation state, as well as regional organizations 
such as the EU. 
For the EU, the foundation of effective multilateralism is the UN, which has “the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”163 This 
declaration is reiterated in several EU documents, such as in the Council declaration 
concerning “EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations” and in the 
ESS. The Joint Declaration of September 2003 is the guiding document. The EU here 
affirms that the “fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations 
Charter.”164 The UN involvement in African affairs is obvious, as the number of Security 
Council resolutions gives evidence: since the end of the Cold War, the number of adopted  
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resolutions has more than doubled compared to all resolutions between 1946 and 1990; 
interventions in local crises and wars become more important, “in particular in 
Africa.”165 
Based on their declarations, the EU has promised to strengthen the UN, equip it 
“to fulfill its responsibilities and act effectively.”166 This includes the training of UN 
peacekeepers from other nations by EU Member States, financial support, and especially 
the provision of personnel.167  
But not only is the UN important for the EU, which “will continue to support 
efforts in favour of the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa, in close 
cooperation with the UN, the African Union and other sub-regional organizations.”168 
The EU’s concept is in line with the “Agenda for Peace” of the former UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Due to the overwhelming demand for UN peace 
operation in the early 1990s, he requested the increased involvement of regional 
organizations in order to relieve the UN.169 
Functional and capable African regional and sub-regional organizations are 
essential for the EU’s basic principles of African ownership and partnership regarding 
peace and security in Africa. Today in Africa are several regional and sub-regional 
organizations existing which are engaged in security matters. Mark Malan describes the  
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multilayered responsibility for peace in Africa as a “peace pyramid.”170 All the involved 
organizations are collective security organizations, designed to deal with threats among 
their members.171 
The organizations differ in their institutional design and, most importantly, in 
their regional responsibility. The organization with global responsibility is the UN, the 
overarching regional organization for Africa, comprising all African states, the AU. 
Subordinated to the AU are the sub-regional organizations: the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) for West Africa, the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) for Southern Africa (interestingly including the DRC), in East 
Africa the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), in Central Africa the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and in North Africa the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU). The function of African regional and sub-regional organizations 
is addressed by many authors and well analyzed.172 
It would go beyond the focus of this thesis to analyze all African organizations 
regarding their institutional design, decision making procedures, capabilities and 
weaknesses; also, this analysis was limited to peace and security matters. This chapter 
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provides only an overview about the UN, the AU, the main partner for the EU in Africa, 
and SADC, which is engaged in the conflict in the DRC. 
A. EU–UN COOPERATION CONCERNING SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
Increasing the authority and capabilities of the UN as the foundation of effective 
multilateralism is a central aim of the EU as the “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-
operation in Crisis Management” from September 2003 evidenced. Both organizations 
emphasized the “existing co-operation between the UN and the European Union in the 
area of civilian and military crisis management, in particular in the Balkans and in 
Africa.” It can be assumed that the experience of the first accomplished EU autonomous 
operation ARTEMIS in Bunia, DRC, was the driving factor that led to the signing of the 
EU – UN document.173 The challenge is that both organizations “share the same values 
and visions but have different roles, build on different structures, use different concepts 
and apply different procedures.”174 
EU-UN cooperation took place in military affairs. Military Crisis Management 
(MCM) cooperation takes place in meetings on the working level as well as through 
meetings of the EU High Representative and the UN Secretary General; the provision of 
military capabilities by the EU Member States or, this seems to be the most important 
issue, by “an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN.”175 The latter was the 
case in both operations in the DRC, Operation ARTEMIS and Operation EUFOR RD 
Congo, which are analyzed in the case study. 
The EU-UN Joint Declaration makes clear that the UN is the central reference 
point for the EU’s actions concerning conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. EU operations have 
to be “in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and in close cooperation with 
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UN operations in that region.”176 This restraint is also valid for the AU and the African 
sub-regional organizations which need an UN mandate to intervene in the internal affairs 
of regional neighbors. The EU Member States could provide support for the UN for 
MCM on a national basis. They could provide “enabling capabilities,” like 
communication or electronic intelligence assets, which are general shortfalls in UN 
operations.  
Initially, the EU as a whole was willing to use its military rapid response 
capabilities, including the EUBGs, to “strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible 
UN requests.”177 The EU will be capable to conduct “bridging” or “stand-by” 
operations.178 The first type of missions could be launched to intervene with EU military 
means in an immediate crisis and to gain time for the UN to conduct a force generation 
process and to establish its own presence in the conflict area. The EU forces should then 
be relieved by UN forces.179 The EU mission would end when the UN troops arrive and 
are capable to take over the mission.180 An example of this kind of mission is the EU 
Operation ARTEMIS. The second mission type envisaged EU military capacities as an 
“over the horizon reserve” to reinforce UN troops or as an “extraction force.”181 The EU 
mission EUFOR RD Congo is an example. In a wrap-up seminar of EUFOR RD Congo, 
further possible forms of co-operation were developed. Two new models for EU 
operations in support of an UN CMO were elaborated: first, a supporting model, “where 
an autonomous EU operation would support the UN operation by covering a specific 
mission or area” and, second, a model of “focused support,” where the EU would provide 
scarce capabilities without launching an autonomous EU operation.” The seminar made  
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clear that the EU is willing to cooperate very closely with the UN, but a unity in 
command, the subordination of EU forces under UN command, is beyond that 
cooperation.182 
B. EU AND AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS 
The EU attributes much importance to multilateralism and integration. The EU’s 
central function is that the “European countries are [now] committed to dealing 
peacefully with disputes and cooperating through common institutions.”183 The European 
Commission declared in 2001 that the “EU is in itself a peace project, and a supremely 
successful one.”184 Inter-institutional cooperation is meant to “export” this promising 
concept to Africa also; the European Commission states “that the EU model can serve as 
an example for other regions in encouraging states to reduce potential tensions, to 
increase economic interdependence and to create greater mutual trust between 
countries.”185 The AU emerged out of the OAU in July 2002.186 The OAU oriented its 
institutional reform using the model of the EU and transformed itself into the African 
Union (AU).187 The highest AU body is the Assembly comprising the head of states and 
governments, similar to the Council of the European Union. The AU Executive Council 
mirrors the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), a body 
consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The AU has also a Commission, but this 
body is mainly just a Secretariat. The AU parliament was established in March 2004. 
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1. The African Union  
African regional, as well sub-regional, organizations traditionally play an 
important role in the EU’s overall policy of conflict prevention towards Africa. In 
December 2003 the Council declared that it  
welcomes the developing partnership between the EU, the UN, the African 
Union and sub-regional African organisations in the field of conflict 
prevention, conflict management and development.188  
Again in January 2004 the EU declared “that the AU and African sub-regional 
organisations constitute the central actors in prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts in Africa.”189  
The EU needs functioning African institutions that are capable of crisis 
management, conflict prevention and peace building. These institutions are necessary if 
“African ownership” of conflicts and their solution should be more than words. Javier 
Solana declared in the UNSC in January 2002 that the EU attaches: 
great importance to our dialogue and cooperation with sub-regional 
organisations, notably SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. They are further 
evidence that Africans today are assuming their part of the responsibility 
for securing peace and stability on their continent. Yet “African 
ownership” can only function effectively, when other countries and the 
UN help to enhance African institutional capacities and closely cooperate 
with them.190 
a) African Union’s Role in Peace and Security  
The OAU, founded in 1963, was the first Pan-African organization and a 
result of the decolonization of Africa. The OAU was emphatic about African state’s 
sovereignty, rejected interference in internal affairs, and declared the sanctity of 
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international borders.191 This basic orientation was abandoned by the AU. This 
organization is willing to play a role in the establishment of security in Africa. Its charter 
abolished the principle of non-interference by stating acceptance of “the right of the 
Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of 
grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” The 
AU condemns and rejects “unconstitutional changes of governments.”192 The AU’s 
entitlement to interfere in internal affairs if fundamental human rights are violated is far 
reaching. 
The AU is according to its constitutive act the ideal type for 
institutionalized multilateral cooperation in security affairs for the EU. The AU’s 
objectives are the promotion “of peace, security, and stability on the continent” and of 
“democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.”193 
An important body within the AU’s structure is its “Peace and Security 
Council” (AU PSC). Its first objective is the promotion of “peace, security and stability in 
Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property … as 
well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development.”194 The AU 
PSC can “authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support operations” and can 
“recommend to the assembly … the intervention … in a Member State in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”195 
The AU is acting as an institution in African conflicts as the peace 
operations AMIS I and II in ... and the new AU operation in Somalia evidences. Despite 
the fact that the missions are not yet very successful, that the AU is confronted with 
several problems and dependent, in many areas, on financial or other support of external 
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actors, these missions are a signal that the AU is willing to act. As a very young 
organization, it will still learn from its experience and improve in the future. 
b) African Standby Force 
Like the EU, the AU needs capabilities to fulfill its political agenda and to 
correspond to the EU’s credo of “African ownership.” One important asset under 
development is the African Union Standby Force (ASF). A detailed survey about the ASF 
was done by Cillier and Malan in 2005; in 2006 Malan issued a progress report and 
analyzed the current shortfalls of the ASF in its command and control capabilities.196 
This force should consist of 5 brigades; each African sub-regional 
organization will provide one brigade. A sixth brigade will be available at the AU’s 
headquarter at Addis Abeba.197 Each brigade should consist of approximately 3,000 to 
4,000 troops and should be authorized as a multinational force to intervene in crises all 
over Africa as the rapid reaction capability of the AU. Its mission readiness is expected 
not earlier than 2010.198 Currently, Africa’s sub-regional organizations SADC, 
ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are most 
advanced in establishing the ASF; the AU itself bears the operational and strategic 
responsibility.199 
The ASF should also include police and civilian experts capable of 
covering the whole spectrum of potential CMO. The concept and the formation are 
influenced greatly by the EU. There are some similarities to the EUBG, which is not 
surprising due to the fact that both formations are designated for the same purpose. 
Partnership, as announced by the EUSFA, is another reason for the resemblance. The EU 
financially and technically supports the AU and the sub-regional organizations in this 
                                                 
196 Jakkie Cillier and Mark Malan, “Progress with the African Standby Force,” Institute for Security 
Studies Paper 98 (May 2005), http://www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/ 
PAPER98.PDF?link_id=3&slink_id=469&link_type=12&slink_type=23&tmpl_id=3 (accessed May 22, 
2007); Malan, “The European Union and the African Union as Strategic Partners.” 
197 Neethling, “Shaping the African Standby Force,” 68. 
198 International Crisis Group, “The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not yet a Winning Combination.” 
Africa Report no. 99 (October 2005), 1.  
199 Franke, “A Pan-African Army,”13. 
 70
endeavor. Workshops were held concerning doctrines under the chairmanship of SADC, 
and concerning Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) through ECOWAS. The EU’s 
support also includes financial aspects and civilian police issues.200  
The ASF should be capable of conducting a challenging mission spectrum 
comprising the observation and monitoring of missions, the conduct of peacekeeping 
missions, intervention “in affairs of a member state during grave circumstances or at its 
request to restore peace and security,” preventive deployment, the “conduct of peace-
building operations, including post-conflict disarmament and reconstruction and the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.”201 
In relation to the EUBG Concept, the ASF is, regarding numbers, much 
stronger. A EUBG is, in its core, a light Infantry battalion plus combat service support 
and combat support elements; one ASF brigade consists of four Infantry battalions and a 
variety of support elements. Based on the available data and the early stage of the 
implementation of the ASF, the author cannot make a statement concerning the mission 
effectiveness of the ASF. It can be assumed that the traditional shortfalls in the category 
of strategic enablers such as strategic air-lift capacity, communication and logistics will 
challenge the project. 
2. Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
SADC, one of the five African sub-regional organizations, is the EU’s partner in 
Southern Africa. This sub-chapter focuses on SADC’s role as a collective security 
institution. SADC was selected as an example for the African sub-regional organizations 
because it played an important role in the conflict in the DRC.  
SADC was founded in 1992 as a successor of the “Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference” (SADCC), whose original purpose was to counterbalance the 
power and influence of the apartheid regime in South Africa. South Africa was integrated 
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into the organization after the abolition of apartheid in 1994. Today SADC is comprised 
of fourteen member states, including the “hot spots” DRC and Zimbabwe.202 SADC has 
scheduled an impressive and challenging plan for political integration: the organization 
aims to establish a customs union by 2010, create a common market by 2015 and a 
monetary union by 2016. 
In the field of security policy, SADC adopted a “Strategic Indicative Plan for the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation” (SIPO) in August 2004. This plan 
“is an instrument for dealing with the Southern African region’s political, defence and 
security challenges.”203 SIPO’s core objective is “to create a peaceful and stable political 
and security environment through which the region will endeavour to realize its 
socioeconomic objectives.”204 The major source of military interstate tensions in 
Southern Africa was eliminated with the apartheid regime in 1992. SADC defines itself 
not only as an instrument to facilitate political and economic integration, but also as a 
tool to enhance security as a prerequisite for sustaining development. Article 4 of the 
SADC treaty declares that “human rights, democracy and the rule of law” are its 
overarching principles.205  
Despite significant improvement, the security situation in the whole region was 
“non stable” in 2005.206 The two major issues of concern in the SADC region are the 
ongoing conflict in the DRC and the autocratic rule of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.207 
SADC member states intervened in the DRC, as it will be shown in the case study. 
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Another intervention was conducted by South Africa, which deployed troops to Lesotho 
in 1998/99, without a formal decision of SADC.208 
The traditional areas of tensions in Southern Africa, the apartheid regime in South 
Africa and the civil war in Angola have terminated. Southern Africa tried for years to 
destabilize its neighbors, Angola’s rebels operated from bases abroad, and Angola’s 
government fought against rebels in their retreat in the DRC. International borders are no 
borders for conflict.209 The conflict in the DRC is currently the major conflict in SADC’s 
region. To deal with such a troubled state in a regional organization is a challenge per se, 
but it shows how important capabilities for intervention and peace support are. As a tool 
for such measures, SADC committed itself in December 2004 to build a SADC standby 
brigade, which should be available for the African Standby Force (ASF).210 The 
effectiveness of such a rapid reaction force depends on the acceptance of the troop 
contributing countries to agree to a potential mission. 
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IV. THE INFLUENCE OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN ON 
ESDP REGARDING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Some EU Member States have a long colonial history in Africa. France, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and, for a shorter time period, Germany 
participated in the “scramble” of Africa. These colonial ties have bound Europe with 
Africa to this day; the policy of EU Member States is guided by perceived national 
interest, including a sense of responsibility for the effects of the colonial history.211 
The European powers with the greatest former colonial possessions in Africa, 
France and Great Britain especially, have never ended their engagement in Africa after 
their former colonies gained independence. The author argues that both countries have 
pushed repeatedly for a comprehensive approach towards Africa through the EU’s policy, 
and especially the ESDP. Great Britain and France have been traditional rivals in creating 
and maintaining their spheres of influence, but overcame that in the late 1990s when they 
aligned their policies towards sub-Saharan Africa. The former colonies of Great Britain 
and France are presented in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.   Africa Partitioned 1914212 
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Both European states were confronted with increasing demands of their colonies 
for independence after the end of the Second World War but only French Algeria and 
Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, the three former colonial possessions of Portugal, 
waged war to achieve that aim.213 Great Britain and France granted most of their former 
colonies independence in 1960. Algeria is an exception because of its French settler 
community and its status as a part of France. The loss of this country after a brutal and 
long-lasting war in the 1960s had serious impact on the French self-esteem as a grand 
nation. However, while Great Britain relinquished it colonal empire relatively smoothly, 
this step was for France more problematic because it was more closely connected to its 
status as a global power and because France had more difficulties accepting the reality of 
a declining power after World War Two. 
Starting from the assumption that France and Great Britain, two of the three 
leading members of the EU, try to influence the EU’s policy in accordance with their own 
national interests, it is necessary to give an overview about the basic policies of both EU 
Member States towards sub-Saharan Africa. 
France’s Africa policy was always military policy. It served national, economic, 
and security interests. France’s engagement in Africa was a central pillar to support its 
role as a global actor.214 Tobias Koepf alleges that France was able to maintain its sphere 
of influence in its African backyard in sub-Saharan Africa through the deployment of 
French troops after its former colonies became independent. 215 Despite the fact that 
today France is less willing to intervene as it has done in the past, two trends are obvious 
since the end of the Cold War. First, France tries to multilateralize its interventionist 
policy, which means that it tries to get UN mandates to legitimize its actions and to act 
through common EU action as much as possible (?). Second, France tries to “africanize”  
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its sub-regional security policy by strengthening African capacities and capabilities. 
France is securing its own interests indirectly, and, in doing so, it can reduce its financial 
and political burden.  
Joseph-Thomas Göller states that France’s socialist government of Lionel Jospin, 
elected in 1997, established a new Africa policy which resulted in a reduction of French 
civil and military experts in that region, a reduction in French military engagement and in 
the region’s strategic importance in general.  Factors causing that political adjustment 
were the French experience of Rwanda and Zaire, where France supported “the wrong 
side,” which hurt France’s reputation greatly.216 Dennis Tull presents evidence that 
France’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa was changed by the new conservative French 
government of president Chirac, elected in 2002, but that this policy led to a military 
fiasco of the Operation LICORNE in the Ivory Coast in 2004. France’s reluctance to 
support the Ivorian government against the rebels fanned the anti-French sentiments.217 It 
is argued that this operation is an indicator of the readjustment of France’s Africa policy 
under President Chirac, and that France will abstain more from military intervention in 
the future and will interfere more indirectly in the internal affairs of African states.218 
Tull expects that France will reduce its engagement and unilateral interventions 
further, despite the fact that the region maintains its strategic political importance for the 
country. Like Koepf, Tull argues that France attempts to “multilateralize” its Africa 
policy in two areas: first, more cooperation and responsibility for African states and, 
second, more cooperation with Europe.219  
Great Britain’s policy after the Cold War regarding sub-Saharan Africa was much 
less active than of France. Africa, in the British view, was more a source of problems 
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than an offer of opportunities. It concentrates its policy in line with the EU’s programs on 
the “promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy on the continent,”220 connected with 
the conditionality of developmental aid, the promotion of good governance and human 
rights. But in general, Africa has been a “marginal concern for British foreign policy”, 
since its global focus is more beyond Africa and its Commonwealth is worldwide. The 
focus of British policy is on its former colonies in Africa, the most important partner 
being South Africa. After September 11, 2001, the prevention of threats played an 
important role and intensified British interest in the region.221 The government of Tony 
Blair was willing to be more active, and employed a variety of policies in response to 
crises in Africa, based on diplomacy, sanctions and, if needed, military intervention.222 
The ideal type for the latter was the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Major motives 
for the British intervention were the protection of British citizens, the avoidance of a 
humanitarian crisis, the protection of the democratically elected government, and the 
support of the UN mission in Sierra Leone.223 After the immediate crisis was solved, 
Britain remained in Sierra Leone and supported SSR and DDR.224 This more demanding 
approach is in conflict with another aim of Britain’s policy: Britain has the interest to 
“improve military efficiency while achieving cost saving.”225 
The different approaches of France and Great Britain toward sub-Saharan Africa 
have been aligned in the last years. France and Great Britain broached the issue of 
peacekeeping in Africa at several occasions. A first step was the French-British project 
taken after the bilateral summit in Chartres in November 1994. Both agreed to increase 
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the support of peacekeeping mechanisms in Africa.226 The French – British summit in St. 
Malo in 1998 is well known for its impact on the launching of ESDP one year later at the 
Cologne European Council. Both states declared that the EU “must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” 227 But both 
states also set the course for “close cooperation on the ground in Africa itself” and for 
harmonization of their Africa policies. Further, they committed themselves to “promote 
the EU Common Position on Human Rights, Democratic Principles, the Rule of Law and 
Good Governance in Africa.”228 
If the main European actors in Africa launch such an initiative, it has an impact on 
the common EU policy toward Africa. France and Britain since then have assumed an 
agenda setting role on ESDP towards Africa. They advocated at their summit in Le 
Touquet in February 2003 the creation of an international finance facility for Africa (later 
implemented as the African Pace Facility) and emphasized the importance of the 
establishment of Africa’s own peace keeping capacities.229 At another summit in London 
in November 2003, both countries their willingness to combine their “efforts to promote 
peace and stability in Africa”; and they called on the EU to “examine how it can 
contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, including through EU 
autonomous operations, in close co-operation with the United Nations.” Another 
announcement pertained to the establishment of the EU Battlegroups. Britain and France 
argued that “the EU should be capable and willing to deploy in an autonomous operation 
within 15 days to respond to a crisis.” 230 The Battlegroup concept, explained later in 
                                                 
226 Lenzi, Guido, “WEU’s Role in sub-Saharan Africa,” in Kühne, Lenzi and Vasconcelos WEU’s 
Role in Crisis Management, 7. http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai22e.html#chap4 (accessed May 22, 
2007). 
227 British-French Summit St. Malo, Joint Declaration December 3-4, 1998, http://www.iss-eu.org/ 
chaillot/chai47e.html#3 (accessed May 22, 2007). 
228 Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Africa 
229 Gegout, “Causes and Consequences,” 432. 
230 Franco British Summit. London, 24 November 2003: Strengthening European Cooperation in 
Security and Defence. Declaration, 1-2, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/UKfrance 
_DefenceDeclaration,0.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007). 
 79
more detail, foresees a tactical, battalion size force for rapid reaction in military crisis 
management operations, a capability which was not available at that time for the EU. 
Another bilateral summit took place in Lancaster House / London in November 
2004. On this occasion both states declared that their bilateral cooperation has the aim “to 
sustain and enhance the EU’s contribution to the building of a better future for Africa.” 
They emphasized that “peace and security are fundamental for sustainable development,” 
and recognized “the importance of building African capacity to prevent, manage and 
resolve conflict.” Furthermore, they declared that “the Battlegroups would allow the EU 
to respond quickly to a crisis in Africa while giving time for the AU or the UN to prepare 
a longer-term intervention.”231 
What these summits have in common is that France and Great Britain were the 
pacemakers regarding European military capacities and the development of a more 
prominent role of the EU in Africa. Both made no secret of their plans to use the 
Battlegroups in African conflicts. This chapter thus supports the argument that “Britain 
and France have undoubtedly been able to dominate the development of the ESDP and its 
role in Africa.”232 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU’S POLICY TOWARDS SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
In this chapter the author will outline how the EU’s political declarations 
concerning conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa have been implemented: 
it will be shown, first, which institutional capacities are available to increase the 
coherence of EU policy; second, which military crisis management capabilities can be 
employed; and third, which civilian crisis management capabilities are at the disposal of 
the EU. In a following subchapter, the ESDP activities will be analyzed. 
A. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES 
The EU declares itself that it is necessary “to make use in a coherent and 
coordinated manner all of the instruments available to the EU, inter alia as regards 
reconstruction, development and ESDP.”233 More coherence, as it is requested by the 
ESS, “requires complementarity in the use of EU instruments (civilian and military) and a 
better co-ordination between EU institutions.”234 This is obvious if the concepts of 
“comprehensive security” or the model of “global public goods” are taken into account. 
Both concepts argue that only the combined employment of civil and military instruments 
can increase the EU’s security. The character of ESDP missions for crisis management 
demands the deployment of military and civilian means. The challenge is that these 
instruments are not only different by their nature; they are sometimes under different 
jurisdiction.  
Figure 7 visualizes the demand of coordination between the EC (first pillar) and 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (second pillar) and also within the 
second pillar.  
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Figure 7.   Requirements for Coordination for CCMO235 
Civil-Military Crisis Management Operations (CM CMO) require inter- and intra-
pillar coordination. Their different political agendas have to be streamlined and 
coordinated to increase effectiveness in crisis prevention and management.  
The decision making procedures for crisis management operations within the EU 
are complex.236 The most important decision making body is the European Council 
consisting of the heads of state and government of the EU Member States, and its 
subsidiary organ, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). Topics 
related to peace and security, including military actions for crisis management, are 
prepared by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a body consisting of EU 
Member States ambassadors. Military advice to the PSC is provided by the EU Military 
                                                 
235 Figure drawn by the author. 
236 Catriona Gourlay, “European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management.” 
International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 404-421; International Crisis Group, “EU Crisis 
Response Capability Revisited,” Europe Report no. 160 (January 2005); Sebastian Mayer, 
“Sicherheitspolitische Interventionen der Europäischen Union: Rahmenbedingungen, Kompetenzen und 
Interaktionsmuster,” TranState Working Papers no. 13 (2005). http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/ 
homepages/mayer/arbeitspapierBeschreibung.php? ID=14&SPRACHE=de&USER=mayer (accessed May 
22, 2007). 
 83
Committee (EUMC) which consists of the joint chiefs of staff of the EU Member States. 
All these bodies guarantee the primacy of national interests in the decision making 
process due to the fact that the second pillar is outside the supranational structure of the 
EU, that the EU has no European-level forces available and can only launch military 
CMO relying on the Member States armed forces. The highest military body of the EU is 
the EU Military Staff (EUMS) which is subordinated to the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the 
European Union, Javier Solana, who is also the Chairman of the PSC. 
An important step towards the coordination of civil and military instruments is the 
establishment of the Civil-Military Planning Cell. A proposal to establish this cell was 
welcomed by the EU Council in December 2003 and agreed to by the Council in June 
2004.237 The Cell should be able to 
• link work across the EU on anticipating crises, including opportunities 
for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization;  
• assist in planning and coordinating civilian operations; 
• develop expertise in managing the civilian/military interface; 
• do strategic advance planning for joint civil-military operations; 
• reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU autonomous 
operation.238 
One part of the Cell is the Strategic Planning Branch and is the key nucleus of the 
Operations Center (OpCen). This is in turn part of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), which 
itself is a division of the Council Secretariat. Its main effort is to coordinate ESDP civil-
military missions, despite the fact that it is an element of the second pillar and therefore 
within the military part. Its task is reflected in its manning: the Cell is headed by a 
military director with a civilian deputy. The Strategic Planning Branch consists of  
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seventeen military and civilian planners. Among the latter are two liaison officials 
detached by the Commission.239 Thus, both intra- and inter-pillar coordination should be 
feasible. 
The OpCen has the capacity to plan and conduct missions within the spectrum of 
the Treaty of the EU on a small scale, in the case that none of the national OHQ could be 
used. Nevertheless, the Council emphasizes “that this will not be a standing HQ.”240 In 
the case of activation, the OpCen is separated from the EUMS under the command of a 
designated Operations Commander and reinforced by additional augmentation 
personnel.241  
B. MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES 
The Kosovo crisis in 1999 has shown that the Europeans were willing but not able 
to act decisively, partially because of the lack of military capabilities. Although the 
deployment of military force is not the EU’s first choice, military “will often play a 
crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development and / or in the post 
conflict phase.”242 Military capabilities can be important, as Hyde-Price argues, for 
“Europe can only act as a force of good in the world if it is prepared to use coercive 
power to back up its diplomacy.”243 
The EU launched a process to improve its military, as well as its civil capabilities 
in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis and prior to the adoption of the ESS. Several 
shortfalls in its military capabilities were identified in 2001. The European Capabilities 
Action Plan (ECAP) was established to close those gaps.244  
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With the endorsement of the (military) Headline Goal (HG) 2010 by the Brussels 
European Council on 17-18 June 2004, another improvement project was launched. The 
HG 2010 states, referring to the ESS, that the EU Member States are willing to provide 
the Union the capabilities which are necessary to increase security and stability in 
Europe’s neighborhood, as well in the world. The aim is to enable the EU  
to respond with rapid and decisive action … to the whole spectrum of 
crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European 
Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, tasks 
for combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking [as well 
as] joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating 
terrorism and a role in security sector reform.245 
The HG 2010 is the attempt to improve the interoperability, deployability and 
sustainability of the MS armed forces. The HG 2010 has defined some “milestones” that 
must be met. These include the establishment of the mentioned Civil Military Cell, 
coordination of strategic joint lift, and the formation of EU Battlegroups (EUBG).246  
The EUBG concept was launched by France, Germany and Great Britain in 
February 2004 by issuing a “food for thoughts paper” concerning the development of 
capabilities in support of EU rapid response.247 The EUBG’s mission spectrum is 
identical with the Headline Goal 2010 and consists in its core of the Petersberg Tasks.248 
The EU BGs are modeled according to the experience of the EU mission ARTEMIS, 
where approximately 2,000 troops had been deployed to the northwestern province of the 
DRC, Ituri. 
A EUBG is a approximately 1,500 troops strong, militarily “effective, credible, 
rapidly deployable, [a] coherent force package capable of stand alone operations or being 
used for an initial phase of larger operations,” to accomplish the missions mentioned in 
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the HG 2010.249 They are fully operational since January 2007. The potential area of 
operations (AOO) is determined by a radius of 6,000 km around Brussels. Much of sub-
Saharan Africa is located inside of EUBG’s AOO as the red line in Figure 8 indicates: 
 
Figure 8.   EUBG’s Potential Area of Operations250 
This limitation is not sacrosanct as the deployment of the European force to the 
DRC gives evidence; it is primarily an assumption for military strategic and operational 
planning. A French-British Joint Declaration states explicitly that the “Battlegroups 
would allow the EU to respond quickly to a crisis in Africa while giving time for the AU 
or the UN to prepare a longer-term intervention.”251 
Further capabilities also include the availability of headquarters on the military 
strategic level in the case of a military crisis response operation without recourse to 
NATO assets. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg announced at their summit in 
Brussels in April 2003 that they intended to establish a permanent EU Operational 
Headquarters (OHQ) in Tervuren (Belgium). This summit became known as the 
“Chocolate Summit,” but the concept of a permanent EU OHQ has been blocked up to 
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now. The rift between MS who wanted to strengthen the EU-US relationship and those 
who wanted to bolster the EU’s autonomous capacity was obvious. The establishment of 
an independent, permanent HQ was seen as a further duplication of NATO and was 
therefore strongly opposed by Great Britain. The EU internal crisis was solved by the 
Brussels’ European Council decision in June 2004 that a permanent headquarters was not 
envisioned, and that autonomous EU operations should be planned and led by 
headquarters provided by willing and capable member states.252 
The Council’s request to make national HQs available for the EU was 
implemented by five MS. Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Greece have made 
preparations to activate an EU OHQ by providing the infrastructure and personnel for a 
key nucleus. After activation, the EU OHQ is structurally separated from the national 
HQ, although it remains dependent on logistics and expertise provided by the host nation. 
EU member states augment additional trained personnel to enable the OHQ to fulfill its 
tasks to plan and run an autonomous EU CMO without recourse on NATO assets. 
Two other options for a strategic EU OHQ are available: first, the “Berlin Plus” 
formula which enables the EU to launch an operation while relying on NATO assets and 
capabilities; this implies establishing a strategic EU HQ at NATO Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), commanded by DSACEUR. Second, the OpCen 
within the Civil-Military Cell of the EUMS will also be capable of functioning after 
augmentation as an EU OHQ.  
The three different HQ options are shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.   Possible EU OHQ at the Military Strategic Level253 
The first ever activation of an EU OHQ to plan and run an autonomous EU CMO 
without recourse to NATO assets was conducted for EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. This 
option was not earlier available. The EU CMO ARTEMIS in the DRC in 2003 was 
planed and led by the French national HQ, the EU operation CONCORDIA in FYROM 
from March to December 2003 made use of the Berlin Plus arrangements and was led by 
the OHQ established within SHAPE. 
C. CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES 
Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) can be defined as “the intervention by non-
military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of 
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preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution;” therefore, 
CCM needs civilian means.254  
The civilian dimension of the EU’s approach to crisis management is much more 
complex than the military. Civilian means, which could be used and / or deployed, are not 
under the unified control of one EU pillar. As mentioned, CCM can be conducted by the 
European Community (EC) (first pillar) and within the CFSC (second pillar). 
1. First Pillar CCM-Capabilities and Measures 
To present the EC’s engagement in CCM in all its facets would go beyond the 
scope of this paper. But it is important to have an overview of the Commission’s 
activities in peace building and crisis management, because the policies of both pillars 
have the same orientation and the instruments should be complementary.  
The EC has many and very different instruments for CCM-interventions 
available; many different Commission bodies are involved in its deployment.255 They are 
comprised of political dialogue, agreements and institutional arrangements with third 
countries and regional groups (such as association agreements and other forms of 
partnership), trade and economic measures, development aid and emergency relief, 
support for rehabilitation and reconstruction and macro-economic support.256  
a) The Cotonou Agreement 
Traditionally the EC conducted a policy focused on economic and 
developmental issues. The first institutionalized cooperation between the EC and some 
African countries was based on the Yaoundé Agreements (1963-69 and 1969-75). This 
arrangement was substituted by the Lomé agreement which incorporated besides the  
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African states also Caribbean and Pacific countries. The Lomé Agreement was replaced 
by the Cotonou Agreement signed in Benin in June 2000 by all sub-Saharan African 
states.257 
As mentioned earlier, sustainable economic development is an element of 
the structural stability concept of the European Commission. In this field the Commission 
makes “substantial contributions to macroeconomic stabilization” and supports economic 
reforms through subsidizing budgets or debt cancellation.258 The EU recognizes that 
economic factors are important for the emergence of conflicts in Africa as well as for 
their prevention and resolution. Economic instability and weakness belongs to the root 
causes of African conflicts. Due to this proposition, the EU attempts to “promote the 
further integration of Africa into the world economy,” “support economic and political 
cooperation” and to “assure that regional trade integration measures … support conflict 
prevention and resolution.”259  
Despite the fact that the Cotonou agreement is mainly an economic pact 
between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, it has also functions 
in security matters. Different issues – economic and political – are linked together in this 
agreement. The agreement includes stipulations for conflict prevention, good governance 
and democratization. The Agreement declares in Art 8 (3) that the signatories “should 
contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political 
environment.” Countries which do not comply with the rules set by this arrangement can 
be suspended. Consultations should take place if the essential elements of the agreement, 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, are violated. If the consultations 
resulted in a formal decision, that the basic principles are violated, “appropriate measures 
may be taken.” Article 96 outlines that these have to be “taken in accordance with the  
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international law and proportional to the violation.” Olsen argues that these regulations 
are tightening the premises for sub-Saharan African states to receive developmental help 
from the EU.260 
The case of Zimbabwe is evidence that this instrument is not used in a 
decisive way to hinder the Mobutu regime which perpetuates the violation of democracy, 
rule of law and human rights. A paper on the Zimbabwe Human Right’s NGO Forum261 
presents evidence concerning that issue in November 2006 and calls for the continuation 
of assets freeze and visa restrictions. 
The renegotiation of the Cotonou agreement is used by the EU to convince 
the African partners to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.262 
Up to now, the ICC is not conducting its own trials against sub-Saharan Africa’s despots. 
It supports the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone that uses the ICC’s facilities in 
The Hague to sue the former Liberian president Charles Taylor.263  
The EU linked migration with the Cotonou agreement: from a strategic 
perspective, ACP countries, as well the EU, see in the reduction of poverty, the 
improvement of living and working conditions, and the creation of employment a chance 
to normalize migratory flows. But until these favorable conditions are established, the 
Cotonou agreement includes an article to facilitate the repatriation of illegal immigrants. 
It declares that 
each of the ACP States shall accept the return of and readmission of any of 
its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of the Member States 
of the European Union, at that Member States request and without 
formalities.264 
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b) Developmental Aid 
During the Cold War developmental aid was an important tool to gain 
influence in the recipient countries. It was already included in the Rome Treaties of 1957 
and thus “became the first element in an embryonic common European foreign and 
security policy.”265  
Javier Solana declared at the UNSC in January 2002 that the EU is “the 
world’s leading source of development and humanitarian assistance in Africa, providing 
more than two thirds of total official development flows to sub-Saharan Africa.”266 The 
EU’s share of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) distributed to sub-Saharan 
Africa amounted to 55 percent in 2004. In a regional perspective, 51 percent of all EU 
ODA were dedicated to that region in that year.267  
Olsen argues that developmental aid lost its significance, despite the 
traditional importance of it for the EC after the end of the Cold War. This might be a 
result of a shift of priorities in the EU’s policy towards Africa. The EU is increasingly 
preoccupied with security issues in Africa. As a consequence of this priority shift 
“development aid was increasingly reduced to being only one among a number of 
instruments in the pursuit of the EU’s policy priorities in sub-Saharan Africa.”268 This 
observation is outdated: the European Council decided in 2005 to double the amount of 
financial aid until 2010 and distribute 50 percent of it to Africa partly to support the 
implementation of the UN MDG.269 The 10th European Development Fund (EDF), the 
main inter-governmentally funded financing instrument of the ACP-EU cooperation since 
1958, will cover the time period 2008 – 2013.270 The EU is willing to offer €22 billion in 
developmental aid. Approximately €20 billion are designated for sub-Saharan Africa, 
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without South Africa.271 The EDF is very important for conflict prevention and post-
conflict reconstruction. An example for the latter is the European Commission’s mine 
clearance program in Angola, funded through the European Development Fund. The EDF 
also plays an important role in financing the DDR process.272 
c) Sanctions 
On the one hand, the EU is capable of employing incentives for African 
states which respect the political conditions connected to the EU – Africa agreements, on 
the other hand, the EU is able to enact sanctions like trade embargos, flight or travel bans. 
These measures are labeled by the EU as restrictive measures.273 
An example of the latter measures is the relationship of the EU to 
Zimbabwe. The democratic transition from a white, racist settler regime to a democratic 
society started in 1980, but its failure has become evident since 2001. Political decisions 
were made by Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s president since 1987, to stay in power but at 
the expense of the law, individual rights, and positive economic development. White 
farmers were labeled as the punching bag to cover for maladministration, their farms 
occupied, the right of the opposition was neglected, the economy collapsed, and the 
national currency was devaluated by hyperinflation.274 Those who are affected by the 
EU’s ban are “individuals who engage in activities which seriously undermine 
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.”275 
In 2002, the EU introduced measures such as the ban on entry into the 
territory of the EU member states and a freeze of national assets. An embargo has been 
imposed on the supply of arms and equipment intended for military operations.276 
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d) The European Community’s “Rapid Reaction Mechanism” 
The Commission is able to fund via the Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
(RRM) projects which support long term development goals like DDR, mediation, 
arbitration and reconciliation.277 It provides funds for humanitarian assistance, like 
emergency relief or demining activities. The European Community provides more than 
€100 million for several areas that are connected with DDR in sub-Saharan Africa.278 
The EC can use the RRM in “situations of crisis or emerging crisis, 
situations posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, 
situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilize the country.”279 
Similar to the African Peace Facility, presented in the next chapter, it is a tool to support 
African peacekeeping operations.  
e) The European Community’s “African Peace Facility” 
The “African Peace Facility” (APF), established in April 2004, is a new 
and comprehensive instrument for the EU.280 This facility has been designed to enable 
regional and sub-regional African organizations like the AU, ECOWAS or SADC to 
establish their own military peace capabilities, such as the AU African Standby Force 
(ASF), and to conduct African owned peace support operations.  
The European Council adopted a common position “concerning conflict 
prevention, management and resolution in Africa” in January 2004. The Council declared 
that the EU is willing to “contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of 
violent conflicts in Africa by strengthening African capacities and means of action in this 
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field.”281 The APF is to be seen in the light of this declaration, and it is the 
implementation of the EU’s concepts of partnership and African ownership. To simplify 
it: the EU is providing the money, the AU the will and the troops to conduct peace 
support operations. The APF is part of the EU’s approach to create capacities for conflict 
prevention and crisis management.  
The first budget covered the timeframe 2004 to 2007 and comprised 
reallocated development funds in the amount of €250 million.282 As it became apparent 
that the available budget would be exhausted earlier than expected, the EU announced in 
April 2006 to provide a new €350 million budget for the timeframe 2006-10.283 80 
percent of the funds are envisioned for operational costs. The initial budget was provided 
by the European Development Fund (EDF).284 Meanwhile, the APF got an additional €50 
million; the 2008-10 budgets of €300 million will be financed through the 10th EDF.285  
The AU has to request the activation of the APF for a special purpose, 
such as an AU mission. This request has to be endorsed by the European Council. This 
guarantees the EU’s influence regarding how Africans can conduct “their” operations. 
The central question, whether or not a peace operation is conducted in Africa, is a 
decision of the African side. The EU’s principles of partnership and African ownership 
are not functioning if the EU has the opinion that a mission is necessary and its African 
partners are not willing or even are in opposition to such an endeavor. In such a situation, 
the EU has to be capable to conduct crisis management operations without the 
participation of African troops and has to rely on its own capabilities. The EU’s will to 
influence African decisions is obvious; the SG/ HR Javier Solana declared that the EU 
“should find ways of using the APF that gives us [the EU] more influence.”286 Influence 
can also be exerted through the limitation of the possible uses of the APF’s budget. Due 
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to the origin of that money from the EDF, its spending is limited to “civil” purposes like 
medical support, communications, transportation and logistics. The procurement of 
weapons, ammunition and military equipment is excluded.287  
Examples of the uses of the APF are the funding of the AU Mission in 
Sudan / Darfur (AMIS) and the ECOWAS mission in the Central African Republic.288 
The financial support provided by the APF for AMIS alone amounted to €242 million 
between June 2004 and October 2006.289 This is also a case which demonstrates how 
European investment in indigenous African conflict management can relieve the EU of 
the burden of starting an own operation and employing its troops. 
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the APF was done and the final 
report presented in January 2006. The evaluation team provided a detailed analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the APF. Two conclusions are important: first, “the APF 
should continue in much the same form as present with a strong emphasis on … African 
ownership”; and second, that the APF’s long term strategy should focus on  
capacity building needs in the African continental peace and security 
architecture. (…) The APF has been a very positive initiative which has 
allowed the EU to support African work on peace and security in a 
practical, flexible and highly relevant manner that has respected the 
principle of African ownership.290  
This positive assessment is not shared by everybody. Wadle and Schukraft 
argue that the available budget is not sufficient to fund long term African peace 
operations, and the AU’s capability to raise its own funds is limited.291 The International 
Crisis Group criticizes the restrictions concerning the use of the APF’s money and the 
exclusion of weapon and equipment procurement. In the case of the AU mission in Sudan 
(AMIS), the AU had to get support in this respect from other donors, including EU 
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Member States.292 Nevertheless, the APF serves a very important purpose. Academics 
allege that “the single biggest impediment to peacekeeping in Africa is funding.”293 The 
APF addresses this problem and is a significant institution for African capacity building. 
2. Second Pillar CCM – Capabilities 
Three years prior to the adoption of the ESS, in June 2000, the European Council 
in Feira focused on four areas of CCM which have to be developed with priority: 
capabilities for police missions, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian 
administration and civil protection. The European Council in Göteborg in June 2001 set 
additional goals with the “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.294  
The EU is now able to provide more than 5,000 police officers “to international 
missions across the range of crisis prevention and crisis management operations and in 
response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations.”295 Rapidly 
deployable Integrated Police Units (IPU) can be made available to substitute for 
ineffective or disintegrated local police forces in a crisis.296 On the initiative of France, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, a European Gendarmerie Force has been established 
as a supplement to the IPUs. These formations have military status and should be used 
“for more demanding scenarios and for rapid deployment in order to guarantee public 
security and public order.”297 
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Concerning the “rule of law,” the EU is now able to provide more than 200 
experts (judges, lawyers and prosecutors) in that field. Such experts are necessary to 
support capacity building in failing states. Rule of law missions can be launched in order 
to 
educate, train, monitor and to give advice with the aim of bridging the 
local legal systems up to international standards, and … carrying out 
executive functions, notably where local structures are failing or inexistent 
in order to consolidate the rule of law in a crisis situation and thereby 
restoring public order and security.298 
In the field of civil administration, the EU is now able to call on its Member 
States to deploy experts in a crisis, “to provide or help provide basic services that the 
national or local administration is not able to offer.”299 
Civil protection, as a field of crisis management, uses the existing capabilities and 
structures within the Member States. These national assets should be employed in 
emergencies for tasks such as search and rescue, the building of refugee camps or 
communication systems. Small rapid reaction teams are available on short notice; up to 
2,000 personnel can be deployed later, if needed.300 
The Committee for Civil Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), also 
established by the Feira Council in 2000, is the central body for the coordination of civil 
crisis management operations.301 
The four core areas of the 2000 Feira Council were supplemented in June 2004. 
Referring to the ESS, the council adopted an “Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of 
ESDP,” and declared that the available expertise should be expanded in order to cover 
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“the field of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform (SSR), mediation, 
border control, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and media 
policy.”302 At the same council meeting, it was decided to set a Civilian Headline Goal 
for 2008. This was adopted in December 2004. The four core areas of CCM were 
supplemented by the formal declaration that capabilities for monitoring missions, as well 
as generic support for the EU Special Representatives, are necessary. It is envisaged that 
the EU will be capable of deploying “integrated civilian crisis management packages” 
similar to military capabilities.303 The Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in 
November 2004 resulted in an offer of more personnel by the MS than was requested by 
the EU.304 
These general capabilities are amended by “multifunctional civilian crisis 
management sources in an integrated format, including rapidly deployable Civilian Crisis 
Response Teams (CRTs)” which should be, despite other tasks, able to “carry out 
assessment and fact finding missions in a crisis or impending crisis situation.”305 
The ESS’ plea for increased capabilities in different areas to accomplish a wider 
spectrum of missions is reflected in the EU’s approach concerning SSR. The British 
Presidency of the EU conducted, in cooperation with the Commission, a seminar 
concerning this topic; the Council adopted an initial EU SRR concept. The latter 
accentuates that the “EU should expect further requests for assistance from third States 
concerned/or from the EU, Regional or Sub Regional Organizations, in particular in 
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relation to Africa.”306 SSR is not a task only for ESDP; issues within this spectrum have 
to be tackled by the Commission as well. This calls for a “two pillar concept,” which is 
not yet available. 
D. ACTIVITIES 
For this study, the author divided the EU’s activities in two sub-chapters: first the 
author provides a short overview over completed or ongoing ESDP missions and then 
focuses in the second part on the EU’s activities in the DRC.  
1. EU’s ESDP Operations 2003 - 2007 
Sixteen ESDP civilian, police and military operations have been launched by the 
EU since 2003. Figure 10 shows the broad spectrum of ESDP missions which are 
ongoing or have been completed since 2003. Four of them, presented in green, are 
military missions. The rest are civil missions dealing with police, rule of law and other 
types. In some of them, police officers have been deployed to support local governments 
in order to improve their police capabilities and to adjust local police forces to European 
standards in codes of conduct or respect for the law. Although the EU is willing to 
substitute local police completely, such missions have not been conducted up to now. 
Other types of civil ESDP missions have been conducted to support judicial institutions, 
such as in Georgia (EUJUST Themis) and Iraq (EUJUST-LEX), or a mission to support 
border control (EUBAM Rafah).  
Five ESDP missions have been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa or are 
continuing. AMIS II (African Union Mission in Sudan), a follow-up operation of AMIS, 
is a still ongoing operation conducted by the African Union (AU) in Sudan’s eastern 
region of Darfur. There is a brutal civil war ongoing between the Government of Sudan 
and its Arabian militias, the Janjaweed, on the one hand and Darfur’s rebels on the 
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other.307 On October 20, 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a resolution 
that increased the personnel strength of police and military personnel to more than 3,000. 
Their mission was mainly to monitor and verify the stipulations of a peace agreement and 
to protect civilians in the vicinity of their positions from immediate threat.308 The EU 
provided strategic air lift for more than 2,000 AU personnel and deployed police officers, 
military experts and military observers to AMIS II. Also included is the provision of 
assets, planning and technical assistance, the training of AU troops and police 
personnel.309 A deeper analysis of the Darfur conflict would go far beyond the scope of 
this research; the conflict is still ongoing. The other four ESDP missions have been 
conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These missions are the 
Operation ARTEMIS in 2003, EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 and the still ongoing missions 
EUPOL Kinshasa, respectively EUSEC RD Congo. These four missions will be 
discussed in the next subchapter. 
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Figure 10.   ESDP Operations 2003 - 2007310 
2. EU’s Engagement in Democratic Republic of Congo 1996-2007 
This subchapter will first provide an overview about the history of the conflict to 
put the EU’s actions into perspective.311 It will then present the UN mission MONUC, 
the main actor for conflict resolution in this country, followed by the EU’s approach 
towards the region. Subsequently, a description and analysis of the EU’s two military and 
two civilian CMO is provided. The conclusion provides an assessment of why the EU is 
                                                 
310 Picture drawn after: http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDPoperations.jpg utilizing 
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311 Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State; Edgerton, The troubled Heart of 
Africa; Nest, Grignon and Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo; Clark ed., The African Stakes of 
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history of the DRC. 
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engaged in the DRC and in how far the EU’s actions are in fact an implementation of its 














Figure 11.   Map of the DRC 312 
a) Historical Background of the Conflict 
The origins of the conflict in the DRC are manifold; they are rooted in the 
colonial past of the country and its unprepared fast-track independence, in internal 
defects of the state such as the neopatrimonial rule of Joseph Mobutu (President of 
DRC/Zaire 1965-1997), and in tensions caused by ethnic rivalries in the DRC’s east. But 
external factors also played a major role in the process which led the DRC to the brinks 
of total collapse: the spill-over of the ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, and two 
Congo wars from 1996-1997 and 1998-2001 in which other African states were involved.  
                                                 
312 United Nations. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Map No. 4007 Rev. 8 January 2004. 
 
 104
The territory of today’s DRC became the “Congo Free State” in 1885 and 
was recognized by the European powers at the Berlin Conference (1884-85) as the 
private property of the Belgian King Leopold.313 His administration was “based on 
exploitation and extraction”, indeed extreme violence.314 The Free State was transferred 
to Belgium and became its official colony as Belgian Congo in 1908. Belgium, like other 
European colonial powers, established a system of indirect rule but was never able to 
exercise power in the whole country. After a phase of violent uprisings in 1959, the 
Belgian government released its colony to independence in June 1960, but unfortunately 
without any preparation. No educated indigenous elite was available to substitute for the 
Belgian expatriates who left the country immediately after independence due to the bad 
security situation.315 Congo was plagued by separatist movements and rebel groups 
operating in its territory after independence. Joseph Mobutu was the first to profit from 
this, making a coupe d’etat and declaring himself president on November 25, 1965. He 
changed the country’s name to Zaire and installed a clientelistic and neopatrimonial rule 
at the expense of the whole public infrastructure, including the educational and public 
health systems.316 The economy declined, no significant development took place.317 
Mobutu’s weak military was repeatedly backed by Belgian and French interventions, a 
policy which cost France much of its reputation.318 
Mobutu’s system of neopatrimonial rule was crippled after his financiers 
terminated their support following the end of the Cold War. Sufficient national revenues 
could not be generated. The death blow for his regime was a rebellion which was 
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launched in Zaire’s eastern provinces by the Banyamulenge people, related to the 
Rwandan Tutsi, in 1996. This conflict was later named the “First Congo War.” A rebel 
organization led by their “spokesman” Laurent Kabila, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, 
was able to seize Zaire’s capital Kinshasa in June 1997. Mobutu, after being in power for 
32 years, fled one month earlier to Morocco, where he died in exile.  
This rebellion was according to Kevin Dunn “planned and directed” by 
Rwanda and Uganda, which had important security interests in the DRC.319 The 
Rwandan genocide took place April 7 to mid July 1994.The perpetrators of this genocide, 
but also many innocent Rwandan Hutus, took refuge in eastern Zaire as the Tutsi rebels 
stopped the genocide in Rwanda. The militant Rwandan Hutus reorganized in Zaire and 
used the refugee camps as recruiting bases and staging areas for attacks on Rwanda. 
Furthermore, they fueled the tensions between Zairian Tutsis (the Banyamulenge) and 
Zairian Hutus. Mobutu’s government was not able to stop the exiled Rwandan Hutus 
from committing further attacks against Rwanda. The latter took the matter into their 
hands and forged an alliance against Mobutu. Their strategic aim was to solve the 
problem of the remnants of the “génocidaires,” the perpetrators of the massacres, and to 
establish a government in Zaire that would reflect their interests. Uganda had its own 
interests in this struggle. Mobutu accepted that anti-Ugandan rebels were gathering in 
eastern Zaire and launched their operations from that area.320 Rwanda and Uganda, 
initially primarily interested in solving their common security problems, aligned and 
organized the anti-Mobutu rebel alliance. 
Angola was also involved in both Congo wars, primarily for security 
reasons. The aim was to destroy its own opponents, the rebels of the “Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de Angola” (UNITA), which operated from the DRC against 
Angola. Prior to the first Congo war, UNITA was tolerated by Mobutu; high ranking 
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DRC officials sold UNITA weapons and supply. The aim to eliminate the long term 
enemy caused the alignment of Angola with Mobutu’s enemies Rwanda and Uganda.321 
After seizing power, Laurent Kabila renamed Zaire in 1997 the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, but his reputation in the country was that of a puppet of 
Rwanda and Uganda. To improve his position and to gain local support, he terminated his 
relation to the former allies and ordered the withdrawal of the Rwandan and Ugandan 
troops out of the DRC on July 28, 1998. Parallel to this, Kabila launched an anti-Tutsi 
policy to exploit existing sentiments for his own purpose.322 This policy resulted in the 
second Congo War. Rwanda and Uganda, dissatisfied with the changed situation, 
supported a new rebel group, the “Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo” (MLC), 
controlled by Jean-Pierre Bemba. Aligned with the regular troops of Rwanda and 
Uganda, the new rebels advanced towards Kinshasa. But this time they were stopped by 
the intervention of three other African states on Kabila’s side. The DRC had joined the 
SADC in 1997 and requested assistance from this subregional organization in August 
1998, one month after the eviction of Rwanda and Uganda.323 Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Angola now supported the DRC against the new rebellion, which was interpreted as a 
foreign-led invasion. The involvement of these three states “changed the nature of the 
war into the first conventional war among states on the African continent.”324 Despite 
this solidarity, each state had its own interests in the second Congo war. 
Angola, former ally of Rwanda and Uganda, switched fronts because 
UNITA established contacts with these two countries, a rapprochement which brought 
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them in opposition to Angola. Angola deployed approximately 3,000 troops to the DRC. 
UNITA was finally defeated when its leader was killed in 2002.325  
Zimbabwe, also officially following the request for support by the DRC, 
had its own stakes in that war. Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe was the driving 
force behind SADC’s decision to intervene.326 Although South Africa’s President Nelson 
Mandela called initially for a peaceful solution, he declared on September 2, 1998 that 
SADC had unanimously decided to support the intervention of Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Angola in the DRC.327 Despite these official declarations, Zimbabwe’s motivation 
seemed to be primarily economic. Zimbabwe has no direct border to the DRC, no rebel 
movement operated from the DRC’s territory. Zimbabwe deployed 10,000 to 13,000 
troops to the DRC. This deployment enabled Zimbabwe’s military and political elite to 
control and exploit rich parts of the DRC and to enrich themselves.328 Many academics 
identify economic benefits as the main motive for Zimbabwe’s intervention, but there are 
also arguments which focus on the official explanation of Zimbabwe as an execution of 
the official SADC decision.329  
Namibia’s interests in the war are less clear than those of the other 
involved states. Security aspects played a similar role as with Angola. UNITA tried to use 
Namibia as a retreat area, but Namibia endorsed Angolan attacks on UNITA, which was 
also on Namibian territory. That decision brought Namibia the hostility of the Angolan 
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Namibian President Sam Nujoma was a close friend of Zimbabwe’s President Robert 
Mugabe. It seems that both tried to balance South Africa’s hegemony through their 
concerted operation in DRC.330 
An analysis from 2006 about the role of economic interests in the overall 
origins of the two Congo wars argues that “economic interests … emerged as a 
consequence of the conflict, and not vice versa.”331 The motives of the belligerent 
factions  
were a complex and evolving combination of regime security, concern at 
preventing ethnic-based harassment and killings, grievances related to 
access to land and citizenship rights, domestic political leader’s interest in 
obtaining a ‘seat at the table’ of a new post Mobutu regime, and the desire 
by neighboring governments to maintain their political dominance within 
the region.332 
The support of the SADC members for the DRC resulted in a stalemate on 
the battlefields and opened the way for alternative, peaceful solutions to the conflict. The 
first step was the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (or Lusaka Peace Accord), signed on July 
10, 1999 by Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and later by 
the MLC and another rebel movement.333 This agreement laid the foundations for the 
solution of the immediate crisis but was not very effective, since the war was not ended. 
One of the major spoilers was the DRC’s president himself. The peace process gained 
momentum when Laurent Kabila was assassinated on January 16, 2001 and succeeded by 
his son Joseph Kabila. The Pretoria agreement between the DRC and Rwanda was signed 
on July 30, 2002, a result of South African mediation. It arranged the complete 
withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC’s territory in return for the disarmament 
and dismantling of Rwanda’s enemies by the DRC’s government. A similar agreement 
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was brokered by the Angolan government, the Luanda Agreement, between the DRC and 
Uganda. The latter was signed on September 6, 2002.334 An agreement that aimed to 
solve the endless internal conflict was the “Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition 
in DRC,” signed in Pretoria on December 16, 2002.335 The belligerent factions, rebel 
movements, pro-government militias, political parties and representatives of the civil 
society in the DRC signed a pact to divide the ministries among them and to establish an 
interim power-sharing government. After a transition phase, national elections were to be 
held. A new transitional government was established on June 30, 2003 but the elections 
were postponed until June 2006. These elections were the reason for the deployment of 
EUFOR RD CONGO. 
b) The UN Observer Mission to the DRC (MONUC) 
MONUC was established as a result of the signing of the Lusaka Peace 
Agreement.336 Part of MONUC’s mandate of 2000 was to “monitor the implementation 
of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire.” MONUC can act 
under chapter VII of the UN Charter and is able to “take the necessary actions” to defend 
itself and “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”337 After the 
UNSC Resolution 1341 was adopted in 2001, MONUC was deployed to the DRC to 
observe and verify the disengagement the belligerent parties had agreed upon. The initial 
size comprised 5,537 personnel, including 500 observers.338 Due to the fact that MONUC  
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was not able to fulfill its initial mission, its size was expanded and the mission 
adapted.339 In October 2004, the UNSC increased the number of military personnel to 
more than 17,000 troops.340 
MONUC’s mission is separated into four phases: first, the implementation 
of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; second, the observation of the implementation and 
the compliance of the factions; third, the support of the DDR process; and fourth, support 
of the smooth conduct of the elections which would end the phase of transition. MONUC 
provided nationwide support for the Independent Electoral Commission and trained 
instructors of the national police. 341 
In 2006 the main bulk of MONUC’s forces were deployed in the eastern 
DRC, approximately 14,600 troops. The Eastern Division’s HQ is located in Kisangani. 
A smaller force, comprising approximately 1,900 troops, is located as the Western 
Brigade in the DRC’s capital Kinshasa.342 
c) EU’s Approach towards the Great Lakes Region 
Concerning the implementation of its strategies, the EU is promoting a 
regional approach to conflict resolution. As it was presented, the two Congo Wars 
involved many African states. Conflict resolution has to take the interests of the involved 
states into account. Solana argued that the conflict in the DRC can only be solved in a 
wider context, comprising the whole Great Lakes Region.343 The EU has been involved 
in conflict resolution in the DRC since 1996. The EU Council appointed a Special 
Representative (SR), Aldo Ajello, for the Great Lakes Region in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide in March 1996. The SR’s mission is to assist the countries of that 
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region “in resolving the crisis affecting their region” and to support the efforts of several 
actors, including the UN and the AU, “aiming at finding a lasting and comprehensive 
peaceful solution to political, economic and humanitarian problems facing the region.”344 
The SR played an important role in the EU’s plan for peace building in the region.345 The 
EU supported the several external and internal peace related agreements.346 The EU 
assists, for example, in the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Process through financial 
and technical assistance in non-military affairs.347 The EU called for “the full 
implementation of MONUC’s mandate” which is “vital in order to reach a degree of 
stability in Ituri and the Kivus.”348 Only one month later, the EU decided to launch 
operation ARTEMIS.  
The European Commission has been involved in the DRC for a long time 
through the activity of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and as an 
important provider of humanitarian help in Ituri, but also through financial support on a 
larger scale. The EU’s financial support for the DRC is significant and channeled through 
different projects and funds. The DRC was in 2004 the top recipient country of the EU’s 
development aid in sub-Saharan Africa measured in absolute transfers; the DRC received 
more than US$ 1.13 billion, labeled as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the 
EU in 2004.349 In September 2003, the EU signed a cooperation program with the DRC 
worth €205 million until 2008. This money is designated for the improvement of 
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infrastructure and of social and political conditions. Further support for the DRC is 
provided through the EDF and following the Cotonou Agreement. Overall, since 2002 the 
European Commission has funded €750 million for programs in poverty reduction, 
institution building and macroeconomic support.350  
d) Operation Artemis in 2003 
Operation ARTEMIS was the first autonomous military crisis response 
operation the EU conducted and the archetype of EU support for the UN. Despite the 
signed Pretoria Peace Accord of December 2002 and the new transitional government 
established in June 2003, the situation in the Ituri and Kivus Provinces in the DRC’s east 
worsened. The root causes of the conflict in Ituri are extremely complex.351 The root 
causes are many, starting with traditional economic rivalries between the Hema, 
traditional stock farmers, and Lendu agriculturalists. Ancient social structures, which 
were socially engineered by the Belgian colonial administrations, the alignment of 
Uganda with the Hema and of Rwanda with the Lendu, the neighbors’ attraction to Ituri’s 
minerals, and in general, the incapacity of the DRC to exercise its authority, justice and 
policing functions in this region were all factors. Local rebel groups disintegrated and 
formed new factions, which fought against each other for the control of territory. 
Civilians belonging to the opposed groups were victims of murder, rape, and violence. 
The situation worsened and assumed genocidal proportions; since 1999 more than 60,000 
people had died and atrocities had been conducted.352MONUC should have provided 
security in that area, but it was too weak to fulfill its mission. The withdrawal of the last 
Ugandan troops in May 2003, a result of the Luanda agreement, left behind a power 
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vacuum. Neither the DRC’s authorities nor MONUC was able to replace the 
Ugandans.353 The UN itself was targeted in Bunia, unarmed civilian UN personnel and 
staff members of humanitarian organizations were killed. 
The decision to deploy a European force to Bunia was a result of parallel 
and interdependent developments in the UN, the EU and France. At the beginning of May 
2003, the UN expected a humanitarian disaster and “massive killing of civilians” if 
nothing happened in Bunia. The Secretary General requested military support for 
MONUC by the UN members as is became evident that the available MONUC forces 
were not able to execute their mandate in Bunia, and short term reinforcement was not 
available. The UN member states were supposed to provide forces to gain time for the 
UN to generate its own capabilities to reinforce MONUC, a typical “bridging operation.”  
France declared its willingness to lead a multinational force on May 28, 
2003 had conducted, parallel to this, its own preparations to mount a national mission 
(Operation MAMBA) in Ituri. MONUC’s reinforcement by non-UN troops was finally 
authorized two days later as an “Interim Emergency Multinational Force” in Bunia in 
close coordination with MONUC.354 As required by France, the deployment took place 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was only temporary and was to be terminated on 
September 1, 2003. The mission purpose was  
to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the 
improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the 
protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in 
Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the 
civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian 
presence in town.355 
Following this UNSC Resolution, the EU Council adopted a Joint Action 
on June 5, 2003 and decided to conduct an EU military operation in the DRC with the 
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code-name ARTEMIS. France was designated as the framework nation, a concept 
adopted in July 2002. A French General was appointed as EU Operation Commander, the 
French Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO) in Paris was 
selected as the strategic command.356 Despite the fact that this mission was an official 
EU mission in the framework of ESDP, there is evidence that France was the driving 
force behind the EU engagement and determined the operational design of the whole 
mission.357 The ESDP mission was formally launched on June 12, 2003, only one week 
after the Council’s Joint Action.358 This impressive tempo was only possible because of 
the prior French preparations. Interestingly, one day after the Joint Action and nearly a 
week before the formal decision to launch the operation, the first French troops arrived at 
the Bunia airport, and on June 10 the French contingent had been increased to 250 
troops.359 The whole contingent consisted of more than 2,000 troops, mainly provided by 
France but also by eight other EU Member States and non-EU Member States.360 1,100 
troops were deployed to Bunia; 750 more were stationed in Entebbe/Uganda together 
with the Forces Headquarters. Approximately 75 percent of the troops in Bunia were 
French.361 The European contingent was initially contested by the warring factions, small 
scale engagements happened but the presentation of overwhelming force and the clear 
will to act forced the militias to withdraw out of a 10 km protective zone around Bunia. 
The city was secured; the expected humanitarian disaster was avoided. The mission was 
successfully accomplished; the EU forces were relieved in place by a UN force and 
returned, as scheduled, back to Europe in September 2003. 
The specific reasons why the EU conducted Operation ARTEMIS are at 
least two-layered. A separate examination of the French and the EU motives is needed. 
                                                 
356 Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2003/423/ CSFP of 5 June 2003. 
357 Ulriksen, Catriona and Mace, Operation Artemis, 512. 
358 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP. 
359 Ulriksen, Catriona and Mace, Operation Artemis, 518. 
360 Beside France, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, Greece, South Africa and 
Sweden provided troops. Austria, Hungary Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain augmented 
the HQs.  
361 Faria, “Crisis Management,” 42. 
 115
Catherine Gegout states that ARTEMIS can be explained through “Realpolitik 
reasons.”362 She argues that there were several reasons for France to “volunteer” for the 
mission requested by the UN Secretary General. The two central motives are that France 
wanted to intervene to prevent a new humanitarian disaster and by doing this, to repair its 
reputation damaged through its role in the Rwandan genocide. More important, so 
Gegout writes, are France’s strategic motives, to present the willingness and capacity of 
the EU to conduct autonomous operations without the recourse on NATO assets in the 
aftermath of the EU internal strife regarding Iraq. She argues that the French attempt to 
increase the EU’s autonomous military capacities is in line with the balance of power 
theory of International Relations. France tried to counterbalance the hegemon U.S.A. 
through the EU. In this light, the reference to the worsening humanitarian situation in 
Ituri served to conceal the real motives. But there are other French motives outlined 
earlier: France’s engagement in Africa is important to its self-conception as a “Grande 
Nation” and the embedding of its operation in a multilateral framework allows France to 
maintain its position while sharing the burden with others.363 
Despite this convincing proposition, I argue that this is not a sufficient 
explanation for the conduct of the first EU ESDP mission in Africa. Of course, France 
was an important actor in this mission; Miskel and Norton even claim that “other EU 
countries including Germany, Sweden and the UK responded to French pressure, turning 
the operation into an EU affair and also contributing troops.”364 However, a France-
centered argument misses an important point, as concerns the EU-level. Koepf argues 
against an overestimation of France’s national interests in the ARTEMIS operation. He 
states that France wanted to use its rapid reaction capabilities and its knowledge of the 
region in order to demonstrate that the EU is capable to mount out of area operations 
without recourse on NATO assets. A byproduct was the demonstration of France’s claim 
of leadership in ESDP matters and a chance to increase its influence.365  
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But still, the EU as a whole decided to mount this operation. ARTEMIS is 
in line with the concepts mentioned earlier in this thesis: it is the implementation of the 
EU’s commitment to effective multilateralism, as well as its will to strengthen the UN 
and EU’s commitment towards Africa after the genocide in Rwanda. In general, this 
mission showed the willingness to act autonomously after the internal Iraq-induced 
dispute; it also acted as a test of the new EU’s ESDP capabilities. The ESS states that the 
interventions in Congo and elsewhere were conducted to “help failed states back on their 
feet.”366 Gegout’s claim regarding the French motive to use the EU to balance the 
hegemonic USA is also valid for the EU as an organization. The rift between the EU 
Member States caused by their diverging position regarding the U.S.-led intervention in 
Iraq was obvious. Ten years after the creation of CFSP and four years after the 
establishment of ESDP, the EU was at odds with itself. The united action of the EU can 
also be interpreted to present the restored unity of the EU and its capability to act. If this 
operation had been spoiled by the EU Member states disputes, the EU’s interest to 
become an important and capable international actor would have been thwarted. This 
mission was important to give a signal that the EU is capable and willing to act 
collectively, even and still after the Iraq crisis. One important factor which contributed to 
the EU’s decision to conduct this CMO was the EU’s wish to test the new crisis 
management procedures and the effectiveness of ESDP. 
e) EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC – DR Congo since 2003 
EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo are the first civilian CMO the 
EU has conducted in Africa. Although they are separate missions and individually 
mandated by the EU Council, they are connected and serve the same purpose. 
The “Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC” and a 
“Memorandum on Security and the Army” from 2002 include the plan to establish an 
Integrated Police Unit (IPU) comprised of 1,008 police officers, with the purpose to 
ensure the protection of state institutions, the government, and to reinforce the internal 
security apparatus. An UNSC Resolution encouraged donors to support the 
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establishment.367 The transitional government of the DRC officially requested EU 
support in setting up the IPU on October 20, 2003. The EU decided on December 15, 
2003 to comply with the request and to rehabilitate and refurbish a training center, to 
provide basic equipment, to train the IPU and, after the training is accomplished, to 
monitor and mentor the IPU for an initial phase. The EU assessed the consolidation of 
internal security in the DRC as “an essential factor for the peace process and the 
development of the country” and decided to support the establishment of the IPU through 
financial assistance by the EDF (support by the European Community) and the provision 
of law enforcement equipment, arms and ammunition (CFSP / ESDP support).368  
In December 2004 the Council decided to establish EUPOL Kinshasa as a 
follow-up project to the financial and material support. Its mission is “to monitor, mentor, 
and advise the setting up and the initial running of the IPU.”369 After a pre-deployment of 
an advance party, the first civil ESDP mission in Africa was launched on April 12, 2005. 
The EU staff consists of 30 members who conduct training activities, participate in a 
board conceptualizing the reform and reorganization of the National Congolese Police, 
and support the “Congolese forces maintaining order during the election period.” EUPOL 
Kinshasa has no executive authority; the EU staff is only entitled to support the DRC’s 
authorities.370 EUPOL Kinshasa staff is, besides other things, advising the IPU, 
developing drafts of regulations; its technical advisors “assist during patrols operations, 
and they go out in the field with the IPU to provide feedback on shortcomings and 
difficulties as well as advice on how to overcome them.”371 In December 2006, the 
mandate was extended to June 30, 2007 and instructed to advise the Congolese police on 
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how to facilitate the SSR process in the DRC together with EUSEC DR Congo, the 
second civil ESDP mission in the DRC – and in Africa. While the EUPOL is focused on 
the DRC’s police, EUSEC is focused on the DRC’s army and the DDR process. 
EUSEC DR Congo was launched on June 8, 2005, again after a request by 
the DRC’s government. This mission should “provide advice and assistance” for SSR in 
the DRC and “contribute to a successful integration of the army in the DRC.” 
Furthermore, the mission should promote “policies compatible with human rights and 
international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good 
governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law.”372 The EU has placed several 
representatives in key positions in the DRC’s administration, such as in the Ministry of 
Defense, the combined general staff, and the army general staff. EUSEC is also 
positioned in the National Committee for DDR to facilitate the DDR process.373 EUSEC 
DR Congo should “provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese army 
and good governance in the field of security,” and should identify and support projects 
serving the purpose of the mission. One result is that members of EUSEC DR Congo 
supervise the payroll system of the armed forces, which was a major field of irregularities 
and an obstacle in the reform of the army. Interrupting the cash flow between superiors 
and subordinates and establishing a regular payroll system could have the capacity to 
reduce neopatrimonial relations and the dependence of subordinates on their military 
patrons. These financial issues are very important; un- or underpaid soldiers are a huge 
threat for the peace process.374 
The overall aims of SSR in the DRC are the establishment of security 
agencies that are capable of accomplishing their task, the provision of security for DRC 
against internal and external threats, and the transformation of the whole security 
apparatus into an institution that respects the rule of law and human rights. This is a huge 
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challenge, not only because of the poor professional skills and the composition of the 
new Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) out of former 
opposing groups, but also in a historic view. For decades the security forces “did not exist 
to provide security for the public in any normal sense but were primarily predatory 
organs used by politicians and officers to pursue individual political aims and economic 
goals while perpetuating massive human right abuses.”375 To overcome such a 
“tradition” is more than difficult. The International Crisis Group argues that SSR is the 
most important issue for the DRC’s “prospects for peace and development.”376  
The EUSFA presents the DRC as an example of the EU’s promotion of 
DDR programs “where a wide range of activities, ranging from the collection and 
destruction of arms to the development of a national army…are at present deployed.377 A 
huge number of different armed groups existed in the DRC, such as the disintegrated 
former Congolese Army, rebel movements, local militias and so forth. Their 
demobilization and integration in the new FARDC and in the Congolese society is a large 
hurdle for a successful SSR in that country. Reports regarding disarmament and 
integration in the DRC give evidence of the importance of that issue for the stabilization 
of the whole country as the overall motive for the EU’s action in the DRC.378 
The financial commitment of the EU to SSR in DRC is significant: from 
2002 to 2006 more than €137 million were provided for its support.379 MONUC bears the 
main responsibility for SSR in the DRC. The EU Member States provided eight experts 
for EUSEC DR Congo. The personnel strength of this mission doesn’t seem to reflect the 
importance the EU is attaching to SSR in general and to that mission in particular. Also, 
given that the EU is not in the lead with this issue, it has to be questioned if this small 
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group is sufficient to fulfill the expectations. Both missions, EUPOL Kinshasa as well as 
EUSEC DR Congo, can be interpreted as a step towards the EUSFA, where the EU 
committed itself to enhance its “support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa” in 
order to “secure lasting peace and development.” The EU “will support in particular…the 
strengthening of fragile states; and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and 
Security Sector Reform programmes.”380 
The overall explanation of why the EU is engaged in the DRC is provided 
in the conclusion. There it is emphasized that the EU’s engagement in this field is in line 
with its earlier declarations and concepts. The EU stresses the importance of SSR and 
DDR in its relevant concepts as an important process in post conflict peace building. 
Because the EU wants to stabilize the DRC, both issues got prominent support by the EU.  
f) EUFOR RD Congo 2006 
The capstone of the “Global and All Inclusive Agreement on Transition in 
DRC” and the end of the transitional phase was supposed to be “the organisation of free 
and transparent elections at all levels allowing a constitutional and democratic 
government to be put in place.”381 These elections were postponed until June 30, 2006. 
The most relevant rivals were the incumbent, the DRC’s President Joseph Kabila, and his 
contender, Vice-President and former leader of the anti-Kabila MLC rebel movement, 
Jean-Pierre Bemba. The greatest concerns had been that the loser would not accept the 
electoral outcome and use violent means to challenge it. The most dangerous area was 
identified as the capital Kinshasa, because of the assessment that turmoil there could 
spill-over easily into the remote regions of the DRC. That made the reinforcement of 
MONUC in the capital necessary. Another factor was the interest of the international 
community to provide the new government a broad legitimacy. Therefore, a significant 
voter turnout was needed. Security was seen as a necessary condition to enable a  
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maximum number of voters to participate in the elections. MONUC’s forces were 
concentrated in the eastern regions; their redeployment was not possible because of the 
situation in the east. 
The UNSC resolution 1671 of April 25, 2006 set the framework for a 
second deployment of EU forces to the DRC. This mission was again functionally, timely 
and regionally limited. The European force should “support MONUC to stabilize a 
situation,” contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence in the areas of its deployment,” “contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa,” 
“execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger,” and 
ensure its own security and freedom of movements.382 Two days later, the EU Council 
adopted a Joint Action and formulated that the EU “shall conduct a military operation in 
the DRC in support of MONUC during the election process, named Operation EUFOR 
RD Congo, in accordance with the mandate” supplied by the mentioned UNSC 
resolution.383 For the first time, an OHQ was activated for an autonomous EU operation 
and established in Potsdam / Germany, a German Operation – and a French Force 
Commander designated. Twenty-three EU Member States participated in this mission, 
with Turkey as the only non-EU state. The largest contingents were provided by France, 
Germany, Poland and Spain.384 
The most challenging step in the preparation of the operation was the EU 
Member States’ reluctance to contribute capabilities to this mission. The fear was 
widespread that mission-creep could embroil the EU in a long-term peacemaking 
operation in a region that was replete of children warriors, warlords and other factors 
beyond control. The German EU Battlegroup, which was on standby, was not selected for 
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that mission due to the fact that the Battlegroups would not reach full operational 
capability until January 2007. However, the needed forces could be generated and 
deployed into sub-Saharan Africa.385 
The Forces Headquarters (FHQ) deployed with 1,200 troops to the N’Dolo 
Airport at Kinshasa, and an additional 1,150 troops were based at Libreville/ Gabon as an 
“over the horizon force” for rapid reinforcement, if the situation in the DRC became 
critical. A strategic reserve was available in France but not called in.  
The first round of the presidential and legislative elections proceeded 
without major incidents on July 20, 2006. The most critical situation for the EU 
contingent occurred on August 21, 2006 when the residence of Jean-Pierre Bemba in 
Kinshasa was attacked by the Presidential Guard of Joseph Kabila after the 
announcement of the provisional results. At the moment of the attack, Bemba was visited 
by fourteen ambassadors and the representative of the UN Generals Secretary.386 EUFOR 
flew in German reinforcements and deployed Spanish and Swedish troops in close 
cooperation with MONUC’s Quick Reaction Force. Both could negotiate a ceasefire and 
the withdrawal of the belligerent factions.387 
The run-off elections were conducted on October 29, 2006 and resulted in 
a victory of the incumbent Kabila. His challenger Bemba accepted his defeat after initial 
rejection.388 This did not prevent violence between Bemba’s militia, which resisted their 
scheduled disarmament, and the FARDC, loyal to the president.389 The intermediate 
result is that Bemba left the DRC “to seek medical treatment in Portugal” on April 11, 
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2007.390 The main body of EUFOR RD Congo troops was redeployed to Europe until 
January 10, 2007, the OHQ deactivated in mid-February 2007.391 Despite the backslash 
regarding the situation of Bemba, the main purpose of this mission could be achieved, 
since it facilitated free and democratic elections. 
Beside the deployment of troops, the EU was also engaged in the 
preparation and conduct of this election. The EU spent, together with its Member States, 
€250 million for the election process and sent over 250 officials for an Election observer 
mission.392 
The explanation, as to why the EU again conducted a military crisis 
management operation in the DRC, is multilayered. First of all, it is again in line with 
“effective multilateralism,” one of the EU’s guiding principles. Responding negatively to 
the UN request would have undermined the EU’s credibility regarding its efforts to 
strengthen the UN’s role in peace and security matters and it would have contradicted its 
declarations and commitments regarding the EU’s role in Africa. Strengthening of peace 
and international security, as well as its own security, the development and strengthening 
of democracy and the rule of law are goals of Europe’s CFSP. EUFOR RD Congo is the 
implementation of the “Stand By Model” outlined in the EU-UN Co-operation in the 
military CMO of November 2003. This model consists of an ‘over the horizon reserve’ 
[here EUFOR RD Congo troops in Libreville] or an ‘extraction force’ [part of the mission 
of EUFOR RD Congo] provided by the EU in support of a UN operation. As the EU 
Council states, such missions “would be of particular relevance in an African context.”393 
The overall assessment of the EU was that the stabilization of the DRC is 
essential for the peace process of the whole region. As outlined, the EU assigns much 
importance to democratically legitimized governments as a step towards strengthening 
democracy, the rule of law and international and regional security. The establishment of a 
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democratically elected government is one step in the implementation of the EU’s concept 
of structural stability. Democracy and viable political structures are necessary conditions 
in order to solve societal conflicts without violence. If the outcome of the election could 
be challenged by the defeated candidate because of a lack of legitimacy, the EU’s whole 
previous engagement, its financial support, its civil and military CMOs and its political 
legitimacy in the region could be foiled. 
Despite the fundamental and general interest of the EU in stabilizing this 
country, there are also some statements that highlight particular French interests in the 
conduct of the EU operation. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, requested EU forces for the protection of the planned elections. 
Peter Schmidt argues that it is not a concurrence that the French high ranking diplomat, 
who served for a long time in the French Department of Foreign Affairs, launched this 
request. He claims that France had a special interest in the DRC and therefore in the 
conduct of this mission.394 Hans-Georg Erhard alleges that Germany was put in a 
difficult situation by France, due to France’s very prominent participation in the 
mission.395 The author cannot judge how far Jean-Marie Guéhenno was pursuing 
France’s national interests or the interests of the UN. The UN needed support for 
MONUC; the EU declared several times that it is willing to do so. Maybe Guéhenno took 
the EU only at their word. The EU is not a unitary actor, national interests persist, and it 
may be that France is the EU Member State with the strongest national interest in the 
DRC respectively in the region.  
But as this thesis gave evidence, the EU as an organization has its own 
interest in stabilizing the DRC and resolving the conflict. National interests of EU 
Member States are secondary in this assessment. France, Great Britain and Germany are 
the three major European powers, so it is interesting what motives the other two states 
could have. Gourlay argues that Great Britain “has neither historical nor economic links 
to the DRC.”396 Nevertheless, she argues that Great Britain wanted to implement its 
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French- British Africa policy developed in the last decade in order to demonstrate that it 
is still interested in the improvement of ESDP. Germany also seems not to have any 
national interests in the DRC, but, as Erhard argues, it has the national interest to 
maintain the EU’s capability to act and to concentrate its power in order to cope with the 
challenges of the 21st century. Despite this, Germany aspires to a permanent seat in the 
UN Security Council. A neglect of the UN request would have undermined Germany’s 
position. The engagement of the EU in the DRC was thus in the broader interest of all EU 
Member States.397 The prominent role of France in the hitherto EU ESDP operations in 
the DRC can also be explained through the fact that France has the most experience in 
crisis management operations in Africa and maintains national garrisons in that sub-
region, which allows the EU to resort to the French knowledge and assets. Future ESDP 
operations in other African sub-regions will show how prominently France will act 
beyond its traditional sphere of interest. 
g) Conclusion  
The previous analysis gave evidence that the EU is committed to the DRC 
and explains the EU’s motivation. As this thesis presents, the DRC is not a direct threat to 
the EU or its Member States; the engagement of the EU is serving an indirect purpose. 
The DRC is without a doubt the heart of the African continent, because of its size, the 
central position and its natural wealth.398 If the whole region were inflicted with violence 
and anarchy, this could spill over through war, organized crime and the displacement of 
people to Europe – not to mention the humanitarian tragedy that would be caused by such 
a development. Javier Solana declared that if the DRC’s stabilization fails, the aims of the 
EU’s development policy would be harmed and the implementation of the MDG would 
be threatened.399  
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Bishop’s model of the “global public goods” is helpful at this point. The 
DRC can only be stabilized if the situation of its citizens can be improved. Traditionally, 
the EU support is provided via developmental instruments, but at its core it is a task of 
the DRC’s citizens; they have to own the process. Necessary conditions for an 
improvement of the living conditions are capable and functioning institutions in that 
country which are accepted by the citizens. A democratically elected government is a first 
step in that direction, but SSR and DDR are also important measures to make state 
institutions capable and to reduce potential sources of tension and insecurity. 
Two key threats mentioned in the ESS are apparent in the DRC: regional 
conflict and state failure. Both are interconnected in the DRC. As long as the state is 
weak and unable to exercise its control in the eastern provinces, and as long as rebel 
movements have the opportunity to use the DRC’s territory as a retreat area from which 
they can mount attacks on Uganda and Rwanda, stable peace is not realizable. In 
addition, the physical control and exploitation of the DRC’s natural wealth, like minerals 
and diamonds, enable them to finance their campaigns. As long as these  rebels exist they 
pose a threat for the DRC’s neighbors and could again be used by Rwanda and Uganda as 
an argument for future offensives. Terrorism is the most important direct threat 
mentioned in the ESS. Stevenson claims that the DRC could become more attractive to “a 
non-state actor like al-Qaeda;” he argues that this “possibility makes major power 
involvement in peacekeeping and nation building more important.”400 Keeping in mind 
the mentioned critique of Simmons and Tucker in combining failed states and terrorism, 
this threat seems to be marginal, but it cannot be neglected.401 The EU’s action in the 
DRC can also be explained by its attempt to neutralize push factors for illegal African 
migration to Europe, as the German Minister for Defense Franz Joseph Jung argued.402 
The EU’s military engagement in the DRC has to be interpreted with the 
background of EU’s normative values, which are diffused through CFSP and ESDP. 
Despite these explanations, in order to answer why the EU as an organization decided to 
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launch this mission, it must be explained why the Members States were reluctant to 
participate, although the CMO is in the interest of all Member States. The author argues 
that this is also the result of rational choice and cost benefit analysis. The deployment of 
troops in ESDP missions is connected with a financial and, more importantly, with a 
political burden. The “Athena-Mechanism” covers common costs such as the 
establishment of the OHQ; the troops have to be financed by the Member States 
according to the principle that “costs lie where they fall.” More problematic than the 
financial burden is the risk that is connected with such a mission for the deployed service 
members. If troops are killed in action, the governments would be under pressure to 
justify this mission. If mission environments erode into war fighting scenarios, simply 
pulling troops out would be difficult to legitimize; expanding their mandate and 
operational focus is, though, risky. Due to the complex environment of crisis and conflict 
in Africa and the EU’s policy regarding that region, it is not easy to explain to the EU 
citizens why they have to bear the burden. The case by case force generation also 
includes a free rider problem. EU Member States which do not participate in an operation 
are impacted by their outcome. 
The EUSFA mentions the political foundations of EU’s engagement in the 
DRC: 
To provide direct support to the African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts 
to support peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and European Security and Defence Policy activities, and military 
and civilian crisis management mission.403 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
This thesis presented the basic concepts, strategies and aims of the EU’s (and to a 
certain extent, its predecessor organization’s) policy regarding peace and security 
towards sub-Saharan Africa. It showed that this policy evolved from a purely civilian to a 
joint civil-military approach. One of the oldest institutional links is the EU’s 
developmental assistance for Africa. The European Development Fund (EDF), 
established in 1958, is a very important instrument for a broad variety of projects. The 
EU’s continuous commitment to lasting development was renewed by the EU’s 
dedication to the UN Millennium Development goals. The second continuing element in 
the EU’s relation to sub-Sahara Africa is in economic matters, marked by the Cotonou-
Agreement. Both financial and economic measures are designed to support a lasting 
development of African states and in doing so they set the preconditions for better living 
conditions for the Africans.  
The end of the Cold War changed the attitude of the EU regarding the quality of 
the supported regimes. The EU’s support became linked to good governance and 
democracy. This conditional developmental support was focused on conflict prevention. 
The EU’s policy became more focused on the root causes of conflict in the mid-1990s. 
Conflict prevention became the primary aim of the EU regarding sub-Saharan Africa. But 
not only had the EU’s political focus on Africa changed in the 1990s. This decade noted a 
fundamental change of the EU’s institutional design. With the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1993), the EU received the competence for the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CFSP). Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) became a part of CFSP in 1999. Finally, a 
fundamental change occurred in 2003 when the EU conducted its first ESDP mission and 
deployed forces to the DRC – the EU became an actor in CMO in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This thesis asks for the rationale, why sub-Saharan Africa matters for the EU. 
The author argues that the answer is threefold: first, the EU’s policy is determined by its 
commitment to its basic norms such as democracy, humanitarian rights and peaceful 
solution of conflicts. The EU believes that these values are relevant on a global scale; 
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they are necessary conditions for peaceful coexistence in an interdependent world. That is 
one reason why the EU supports the UN and other international organizations which have 
the same agenda. The diffusion of its norms is a primary driving factor in the EU’s policy 
towards sub-Saharan Africa. Effective multilateralism is allowing the implementation of 
this political aim.  
The second group of factors which explains why sub-Saharan Africa matters is 
exogenous, such as the experience of humanitarian disasters in central Africa or the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The genocide in Rwanda, an incident which is a 
fundamental violation of the EU’s values, could happen because the world community 
was not willing to intervene and to stop the atrocities. The EU learned the lesson that 
such a catastrophe has to be avoided in the future. The terrorist attacks of 2001 have 
drawn the EU’s attention to diffuse and non-traditional security threats. Potential threats 
for the EU’s security emerge in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the concentration of failed 
states, regional conflict and organized crime. These destabilizing effects could spill-over 
to Europe. To increase its own security, the EU is willing to not only tackle the root 
causes of these threats, but also to intervene in an open crisis. Africa gained strategic 
importance for the EU. The experience with ESDP operations in other regions 
demonstrated that a more active approach, combining civil and military means, is 
necessary for conflict resolution.  
The third motivational factor is the national interest of certain EU Member States. 
All Member States try in a legitimate way to pursue their interests via the EU. This thesis 
shows that Great Britain and especially France try to achieve their goals in sub-Saharan 
Africa with the support of the EU. This offers a chance to share the financial, military and 
political burdens. Also, joint actions of the EU are regarded less suspiciously by the 
Africans, not as neocolonial endeavors but as autonomous actions by a highly respected 
single European entity. The use of the EU as a vehicle for the pursuit of national interests 
is only possible because the national interests are not contrary to the overall aims of the 
EU and in line with its general policy. Nevertheless, it has been shown that important 
improvements in military capacities as well as certain ESDP operations in sub-Saharan 
Africa were pushed by France, less by Great Britain.  
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This thesis presented the EU’s basic security concepts regarding sub-Saharan 
Africa and showed that the EU acts on the basis of a comprehensive security concept, 
which is outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS) and goes beyond the Realist 
concept of national security. The EU’s security is not limited to the absence of military 
threats. The EU Strategy for Africa (EUSFA) builds on a concept of comprehensive 
security and emphasizes the importance of peace in Africa for the EU itself. The EUSFA 
covers the timeframe 2006 to 2015 and outlines how the EU is willing to assist Africa in 
its attempt to achieve lasting development, good governance and security. The recurring 
element in these strategies is the emphasis on development to tackle the root causes of 
conflict, the prerequisite of development being security. Security enables African 
societies to develop. The latter increases the EU’s security because it eliminates the root 
causes of conflict, stabilizes states and reduces organized crime. The EU’s concepts 
evolved from developmental support to a more security focused approach. Concepts were 
developed to stabilize post-war societies through Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration measures (DDR). 
This thesis gave evidence that the EU today has a broad variety of civilian and 
military means, capabilities and programs – its instruments – available to promote its 
aims and that more are in the process of development. The EU disposes today, despite 
others, a rapid reaction force, the EUBG and a command structure including a Strategic 
Command, the OHQ, which enables the EU to plan and conduct autonomously military 
crisis management operations which are limited in time and scope. The EUBG’s design 
makes them suitable for interventions in sub-Saharan Africa – which was the idea of the 
initiating nations France and Great Britain. Further military improvements are prefaced 
and scheduled in the European Capabilities Action Plan or the (military) Headline Goal 
2010. Significant improvements have been accomplished in the EU’s civilian crisis 
management capacities. The European Commission adjusted its agreements and 
programs so that they better serve the EU’s overall aims. Conditional trade agreements 
and developmental support as well as sanctions can be applied to support the EU’s 
policy. The new Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the African Peace Facility 
(APF) are important instruments to finance emergency demands or to subsidize African 
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crisis management operations. In the last years the EU established unique capabilities for 
civil crisis management operations and is now capable to deploy at short notice police 
units, judicial experts and crisis response teams. The EU has a combination of 
instruments available which make it a unique actor. Last, but not least, the EU adapted its 
institutional design to be in a better position to coordinate its policies and strategies 
between the different pillars.  
This thesis showed how the EU implemented its policy, how it deployed its assets 
into the field, focusing its analysis on the case of the EU’s engagement in the DRC. It 
presents evidence that the EU is indeed true to its word. As outlined in the various 
concepts, programs, and declarations, the EU is willing to employ its capabilities. The 
EU’s engagement in the DRC shows how the EU is able to use different civil and military 
capabilities in an integrated manner. The focus is on financial support in various areas 
such as development, SSR, DDR and the building of infrastructure. Under certain 
circumstance, the EU is willing to deploy military forces to sub-Saharan Africa. These 
deployments support the overall aims, such as the strengthening of the UN or intervention 
in crisis situations to avoid humanitarian disasters. I argue that the EU’s engagement 
seems to be limited in scope, scale and time, though. The EU’s strategic limitations force 
the EU to avoid any large scale, risky and unlimited involvement in a sub-Saharan 
African crisis. Despite the general commitment to sub-Saharan Africa, the EU Member 
States are still reluctant to participate in CMO in that region as EUFOR RD Congo gave 
evidence. Therefore, the EU embarked on an indirect strategy to implement its strategic 
goals.  
Partnership and ownership are the basic principles of the EU’s policy towards 
sub-Saharan Africa. To meet its goals, the EU places great importance on effective 
multilateralism, supports the organizations of the “African Peace Pyramid,” the UN, AU 
and the sub-regional organizations. This serves the EU’s interest to avoid, as long as it is 
possible, its own military involvement in crises on the sub-continent. Nevertheless 
effective multilateralism is also burdensome. The responsible organization on a global 
level is the UN. The UN is leading the process of state building with the aim to stabilize 
the DRC as well as the whole region. Taking into account the principles of subsidiarity 
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and solidarity, the EU has the self imposed duty to support the UN with its own assets 
when other options are not available, as the engagement in the DRC gives evidence. It 
seems that military CMO are a means of last resort for the EU; the reluctance to 
participate with its own capabilities in the hybrid AU-UN mission in Darfur gives 
evidence of that tendency. EU’s CMOs in DRC are up to now unique. Other crises in 
sub-Saharan Africa such as in Sudan and in Somalia are obvious. The AU tries to cope 
with these crises, but was up to now not able to solve them. The future will prove how the 
EU will continue to stick to its concepts and strategies and support the AU with its own 
means, if assistance is requested in situations which are more demanding and challenging 
than the hitherto EU CMOs.  
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